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BLANK SLATES
Matthew Tokson†

Courts sometimes confront gaps in formal law, where doctrinal sources like text,
history, and precedent offer no guidance in resolving a particular case. When these gaps
are narrow, judges can generally address them through analogical reasoning or intuition.
But sometimes legal gaps are too substantial to be filled with one-off decisions, and judges
are called upon to create whole legal tests without formal guidance or constraint. Courts
lack a theoretical framework for addressing these difficult situations.
This Article analyzes these phenomena, which I refer to as legal blank slates, and
provides a framework for addressing them. Blank slates are less common than other types
of legal indeterminacy, like interpretive controversies, institutional conflicts, or narrow
formal gaps. But they arise fairly regularly and often involve important legal issues. This
Article surveys examples of blank slates in areas like Fourth Amendment law, free speech,
the dormant Commerce Clause, and anti-discrimination law and draws lessons for a
general theory of blank slates. It offers several strategies that courts might use to effectively
address blank slates and develops a framework for choosing the best approach for a given
situation.
Ultimately, blank slate theory can shed light on concrete doctrinal questions as well
as broader debates about legal interpretation. It can, for example, suggest a new approach
for determining the Fourth Amendment’s scope and help explain why previous Fourth
Amendment regimes have been unsuccessful. More generally, the theory can provide a
unique perspective on interpretive debates, using the extreme case of blank slates to gain
fresh insights into legal interpretation as a whole.
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INTRODUCTION
Indeterminacy can be found in every area of law. How a general legal rule
should apply to a particular case is often unclear. Formal sources of law may
conflict with each other, as may constitutional values, or branches of government.
And legal regimes may leave gaps where doctrinal sources like text, history, or
precedent offer no guidance in resolving a particular question.
Judges can often fill narrow gaps in law by reasoning from analogous
precedents or relying on their intuitions about which outcome is fairest or best.1
But some legal gaps are too substantial to be addressed with a one-off decision.
They may, for instance, present legal questions that require courts to define a
concept or create a test that potentially covers a broad range of conduct.2 In these
situations, courts are compelled to develop a standard to guide future
decisionmaking—yet they must do so in the absence of formal guidance or
constraint. We currently lack any concrete theory of how courts should proceed
in such situations.
This Article’s primary aim is to develop such a theory. It begins by identifying
and exploring the concept of legal blank slates (“blank slates”). Blank slates are
legal gaps that require a test or standard to resolve. Thus a legal blank slate
involves 1) a legal question that calls for the promulgation of a test or standard,
and 2) the absence of formal guidance for courts in shaping such a test or standard.
Blank slates are less common than other types of legal indeterminacy. But they
occur fairly regularly and often involve important legal issues.
For example, one of the most difficult questions in constitutional law concerns
the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Courts have struggled to define the concept
of a Fourth Amendment “search” for decades, adopting various standards only to
later reject or modify them as they fail to produce coherent answers.3 Indeed, the
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 82–83, 106–08 (2008); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW 195–97 (1979). Judges might also fill certain gaps by applying extralegal default rules. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional
Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 520–23 (2013).
2 See infra Part I.A.
3 Compare Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (the Fourth Amendment is
limited to tangible things), with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (the Fourth
Amendment’s scope is not based on physical intrusion but is determined by expectations
of privacy), with United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (the Fourth Amendment’s
scope is also determined by trespass concepts); with Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409
(2013) (abandoning the trespass concept for a concept based on physical touching and
1
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failures of current Fourth Amendment law might prompt us to reexamine the text,
history, and purpose of the Amendment, in the hopes of discovering a more
effective standard for Fourth Amendment search.
Yet in doing so, we only encounter a deeper mystery. Formal sources of law
offer virtually no guidance on the scope of Fourth Amendment search. The text
does not define “search,” external sources give vague and conflicting definitions,
and in context the term has a vast spectrum of potential meanings ranging from
any gathering of information whatsoever to the physical inspection of a particular
place.4 The drafting and ratification histories of the Amendment are silent on the
issue.5 History in general tells us scarcely more than that the physical inspection
of a house is a search—a wholly uncontroversial proposition that sheds little light
on modern search questions.6 And what little we know about the purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is too vague and abstract to dictate which government actions
constitute “searches.”7 In short, formal law is essentially silent on the issue, yet
judges are compelled to set some standard to guide future courts and other legal
actors. If courts discard the current standard that governs the Fourth
Amendment’s scope, what remains is a legal blank slate.
This Article examines the blank slate of Fourth Amendment scope and
surveys other important blank slates in areas like free speech, the dormant
Commerce Clause, and anti-discrimination law.8 It evaluates how courts have
confronted these difficult issues and draws lessons from these case studies for
blank slate theory generally.
The Article analyzes several potential approaches to blank slates. Like most
difficult legal or policy questions, blank slates tend to involve a balance of
competing considerations.9 The various strategies for resolving blank slates can
be characterized by how they approach this underlying balance. For instance, a
court might engage in direct normative balancing, creating a test that encompasses
important considerations on each side of an issue and weighs them against each

social norms); see also Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 503, 507–22 (2007) (describing how courts have departed from the Katz standard
in a variety of ways, creating multiple competing tests for Fourth Amendment scope);
infra Part II.A.3.
4 See infra Part II.C.1
5 See infra Part II.C.2.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 See infra Part II.
9 See infra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
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other.10 A court might instead use a proxy standard that is meant to capture key
elements of the underlying normative balance, but which is generally clearer or
easier to apply.11 Or, a court might choose not to choose, declining to give a
explanation for its decision in the hopes that a future decisionmaker with more
information or institutional capacity will do a better job.12
The Article offers a meta-theory to help determine which strategy is optimal
in a given situation. In general, the best strategy will vary based on the
characteristics of the blank slate at issue. For instance, the more complex, broad,
or unstable the blank slate, the more likely it is that direct balancing will be the
optimal approach.13 By contrast, narrower blank slates or those that raise issues
on which there is little empirical data are more likely to be effectively addressed
by proxy standards.14 The article examines these and other factors and develops a
detailed framework to help guide courts confronting blank slates.
Blank slate theory has implications for both concrete doctrinal questions and
broader debates about legal interpretation. It can be used to evaluate courts’
current approaches to blank slates and to help devise new, more effective legal
tests. If existing law employs a balancing test where a proxy is likely to perform
better, or vice versa, that can be a powerful argument in favor of doctrinal change.
The theory can, for example, help point the way towards an optimal regime
for determining the Fourth Amendment’s scope. Government surveillance
presents complex legal and policy issues and encompasses a wide variety of
government activities. The technological and social context of government
surveillance is also especially unstable, and Fourth Amendment proxy standards
have a history of being disrupted by new technologies. And the difficulty of
obtaining relevant information about privacy harms, chilling effects, and law
enforcement effectiveness is gradually decreasing.15 Overall, blank slate theory
suggests that some form of balancing test is likely to be the optimal approach for
The tests that govern content-neutral speech restrictions and government employee
speech in First Amendment law are examples of this approach to blank slates. See infra
Part II.A.
11 The Katz test that defines the Fourth Amendment’s scope by reference to people’s
“reasonable expectations of privacy” is a proxy standard meant to stand in for the
normative question of whether people should have privacy. See infra text accompanying
notes 89–90.
12 Examples of choosing not to choose will typically be unpublished district court
opinions, although higher courts sometimes attempt this option, with mixed results. See
infra text accompanying notes 94–102.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 103–109.
14 See id.; infra text accompanying notes 115–118.
15 See infra Part III.A.1.
10
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Fourth Amendment search.16 Although an effective proxy test might someday be
devised, none currently exists, and none is likely to emerge.
Blank slate theory can also inform broader debates about legal interpretation
and suggest improvements to both formalist and non-formalist interpretive
theories. It offers a unique perspective on interpretive debates because blank
slates function largely outside of these debates—they exist only when formal
sources do not guide or constrain interpretation. Blank slate theory can improve
non-formalist theories by providing specific direction to courts in reaching optimal
outcomes or fashioning legal regimes that fit best with the broader justifications
behind a body of law. And it can refine formalist theories, many of which
acknowledge the possibility of legal gaps, by identifying significant gaps in formal
regimes and offering a normatively appealing method for resolving them.17
Indeed, blank slate theory can contribute to interpretive theories even in
situations where formal law is relatively clear. The theory can help courts
concerned with maximizing utility to trade off the institutional and epistemic
benefits of formal law against the costs of applying flawed tests. Under more
formal approaches, it can help to determine when a statutory test is unworkable
and should be repealed, or when courts should narrowly apply a precedent rather
than expanding its reach. Moreover, when doctrinal sources provide only slight
or ambiguous guidance, blank slate theory can bolster formal approaches and aid
courts in construing underdeterminate law.
The following discussion proceeds in three Parts. Part I defines the concept
of blank slates in detail and offers a theory of how courts can optimally address
them. Part II surveys examples of blank slates, evaluates how courts have
responded to them, and draws lessons for blank slate theory in general. Part III
applies blank slate theory to the question of Fourth Amendment search. It then
explores the implications of the theory for legal interpretation in general and
examines how the theory can contribute to the rulification and legal change
literature.

I. THEORIZING LEGAL BLANK SLATES
Difficult questions abound in law, particularly in the subset of legal conflicts

See id.
For examples of formal theorists acknowledging the theoretical possibility of gaps in
formal law, see, e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130
HARV. L. REV. 1079, 1131, 1146–47 (2017); Solum, supra note 1, at 471; Thomas M. Merrill,
The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 43 (1985).
16
17
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that produce a written judicial opinion. A legal question may be difficult because
formal sources of law point in different directions, or because policy
considerations are in tension with existing formal law. It is often hard to determine
how an abstract legal proposition should apply to a given case. Resolving clashes
between the federal government and the states, or between co-equal branches of
government, is especially challenging. These situations can all present courts with
difficult and uncertain questions of interpretation, judgment, or policy. But these
are not what I mean by “blank slates.”
A blank slate refers not to any situation of legal uncertainty, but to broad
questions of law for which there is minimal formal guidance. This Part offers a
theory of legal blank slates and how courts can optimally address them.

A. Defining Blank Slates
1. The Spectrum of Legal Determinacy
Blank slates are extreme cases, existing at the far edge of the spectrum of legal
determinacy. This section examines the range of legal determinacy, from clear
applications of law all the way to blank slates.
In law and legal scholarship, we pay the most attention to persistent legal
controversies, where the meanings of laws are disputed. But the vast majority of
legal rules and applications are uncontroversial and clear. We know to stop at
stop signs, avoid a vast catalog of crimes and civil offenses, and pay our taxes by
April 15th.18 We also know that a president must be thirty-five years of age, that
the government cannot impose prior restraints on the press, and that accused
persons have the right to a jury trial.19 Even the legal questions involved in trial
litigation are frequently uncontested or have determinate answers, and (albeit for
various reasons) the overwhelming majority of cases in the federal courts of
appeals elicit no dissent.20
Then there is the vast arena of legal controversy, where lawyers use various
theories of interpretation and construction to answer difficult legal questions. In

See Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories
of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1298 (2015).
19 See id.
20 Id.; Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An
Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319, 1331 (2009); see also The
Supreme Court 2013 Term: The Statistics, 128 HARV. L. REV. 401, 406 (2014) (reporting that
roughly 64% of Supreme Court cases in the 2013 were unanimous).
18
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these situations, text, context, general history, legislative history, intent, precedent,
and/or policy considerations may conflict. Judges will resolve such disputes by
assessing which side has the most compelling interpretive argument, and many
judges will have systemic preferences for certain interpretive methods over
others.21 The meaning of the Second Amendment prior to the Court’s decision in
District of Columbia v. Heller,22 for example, was an especially controversial and
difficult question.23 Yet it was not a blank slate in terms of formal law. Different
sides of the dispute offered competing textual and/or historical interpretations of
the Amendment, many of which yielded answers that were in tension with the
answers given by longstanding precedent.24 The Court had to analyze these
competing sources of formal law, to weigh (or decline to weigh) them against
extra-formal policy considerations, and to choose among the various competing
historical, textual, precedential and other interpretations in order to reach a
definitive interpretation and a corresponding outcome. The formal sources were
conflicting and ambiguous, but they ultimately yielded a final answer.
Relatedly, in constitutional law, there are areas where two or more
constitutional values conflict, and courts must either reconcile them or choose
which will predominate.25 Courts might resolve these cases on any of several
grounds, perhaps by determining which principle more directly governs the
dispute, which was latest to be enacted, or which serves more important or
fundamental values.26 Separation of powers and federalism issues are similar, as
courts may be called upon to resolve conflicts between different branches of
government, or between the federal government and the states.27 Courts can
generally draw on sources like text, historical practice, and precedent to resolve
conflicts between institutions, although these sources likely offer less guidance
than in the typical case. Systemic preferences as to methods of interpretation, as
well as political or institutional preferences, are likely to play a prominent role.

See POSNER, supra note 1, at 92. Thus an originalist judge may prefer text and history to
precedent and policy consequences, while a common-law constitutionalist might have
the opposite preference.
22 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
23 See generally Mark V. Tushnet, OUT OF RANGE: WHY THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T END THE
BATTLE OVER GUNS (2007).
24 See United States v. Miller, 307 US 174 (1939) (interpreting the Second Amendment to
apply only to state militias).
25 Cases may arise where property rights conflict with free speech rights, Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), or principles of individual liberty with principles of
equality, compare Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), with Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 449 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See generally Louis Henkin,
Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1022, 1029–32 (1978).
26 See Henkin, supra note 25, at 1031–32.
27 See id. at 1032–37; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705–13 (1974).
21
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Then there are legal scenarios that offer even less formal determinacy than
those described above. For instance, courts are often asked to apply broad legal
rules to specific, unique disputes. Whether such a rule applies to a situation
beyond the central domain of the rule may be unclear.28 In most such situations,
courts can seek some guidance from relevant precedents, widely accepted canons
of construction, or historical analogues.29 For example, a court might construe the
broad concept of “negligence” in tort law by examining cases where similar
conduct was considered to be negligent. Or it might construe the vague term
“prospectus” in one provision of a statute by giving it the same meaning that it
has in a different provision of the same statute.30 In these cases, formal sources
may direct courts to a particular construction of vague texts or broad legal
principles.
Finally, there are questions for which existing formal sources do not provide
any meaningful answer. Any legal regime, be it constitutional, statutory, or
common law, will unavoidably leave doctrinal gaps that judges must fill in the
course of resolving disputes.31 Legal theorists have disputed whether these
formally indeterminate legal questions have “right” answers in terms of normative
consistency, morality, and fit with the overall structure and narrative of law.32
These debates are largely tangential to the discussion of formal indeterminacy
here. In discussing “legal gaps,” I refer simply to legal questions on which
traditional doctrinal sources (text, history, precedent, etc.) provide no useful
guidance. Even proponents of the right answer thesis like Ronald Dworkin
concede that some cases will be indeterminate in terms of doctrinal evidence.33
Their point is that these cases can be said to have a right answer based on moral
or other considerations even though the rightness of the answer is not

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 126–27 (3d. ed. 2012).
See id.; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 295 (2017).
30 See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569–70 (1995).
31 E.g., Thomas W. Merrill, supra note 17, at 33. Even formalist theorists almost
universally acknowledge the existence of legal gaps. See, e.g., id.; Baude & Sachs, supra
note 17, at 1131, 1146–47 (discussing “cases…beyond the power of interpretive rules to
cure” and noting residual indeterminacy even if one adopts both original textual
meaning and “original methods” of constructing law from ambiguous texts); Solum,
supra note 1, at 471 (acknowledging constitutional gaps “in which the constitutional text
requires the existence of a rule of constitutional law but does not provide the content of
that rule”).
32 Compare RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 138, 142, 161 (1985) (contending
that every legal question has a best answer in the broader normative sense), with
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 197–203 (1990) (contending that
many legal questions have no “correct” answer).
33 DWORKIN, supra note 32, at 134–40; 142.
28
29
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“demonstrable” in terms of formal law.34 On the Dworkinian view, principles of
morality and integrity are no less “legal” than doctrinal sources like text and
precedent.35 I take no position on these issues, except to clarify that the concept of
blank slates refers to an absence of doctrinal guidance. Cases presenting doctrinal
blank slates might nonetheless have correct legal answers in terms of morality or
other principles. Indeed, the theory of blank slates that I offer below may assist
judges in fashioning legal tests that fit best with existing legal structures and their
normative justifications, thus helping judges formulate the “correct” test despite
the absence of traditional formal guidance.36
Legal gaps can arise in a variety of doctrinal regimes. In the common law
context, courts often confront gaps when they are faced with questions of first
impression, when no existing precedent in any jurisdiction has yet addressed a
particular legal question. In wholly unique cases, judges may rely on their
intuitions about which outcome is fairest or best.37 Usually, however, these
questions are sufficiently related to those resolved in previous cases that courts
can draw non-determinative but helpful analogies.38 Courts deciding novel cases
often consider competing analogies or frameworks and choose the one that seems
most closely related to the current situation.39 A sophisticated judge may decide a
new case by discerning the unstated rationales of previous cases and using them
to reach the optimal outcome.40 This process of comparison and analogy to
previous cases is at the core of the common law, “a system built up by gradual
accretion of special instances.”41
Constitutional provisions are often abstract and broad, leaving gaps for courts
to fill when they decide particular cases. For instance, a general constitutional
principle may be wholly indeterminate in its application to a specific situation.42
Some provisions are only partially determinate, ruling out some results but still
Id. at 142.
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 225–27 (1986).
36 See supra Part I.B.
37 POSNER, supra note 1, at 106–08; DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 38 (2010).
38 E.g., Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6–7 (1936)
(describing how paradigm common law decisions are narrow, results-focused, and based
on analogy, and noting that general rules or principles in the common law typically only
emerge as related precedents accumulate over time).
39 POSNER, supra note 1, at 180–81.
40 Id. at 180–83 (describing how a court held that steamboat operators owe a high duty of
care to protect their guests from theft because a steamboat stateroom is more analogous
to a hotel room, where the hotel can efficiently prevent theft, than to an open railroad
berth, where theft is harder to prevent and more responsibility must fall on the
passenger).
41 Stone, supra note 38, at 6.
42 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 8 (1999).
34
35
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permitting a variety of outcomes.43 Courts might fill in these gaps by using extraconstitutional default rules,44 reasoning from analogous constitutional
precedents,45 or relying on their intuitions regarding the best outcome for a
particular case.46
Gaps in statutes arise because it is generally impossible for a statutory scheme
to provide a rule for every eventuality or anticipate every potential application of
a rule.47 Courts are often called upon to fill these gaps, in a process similar to
addressing new questions in a common law system. When filling relatively
narrow statutory gaps, courts can sometimes look to the objectives of the statute
or to the broader statutory structure. Judges can then select an outcome that best
comports with the rest of the statute and effectuates its goals.48 Thus it may be
possible to answer specific questions like “does ERISA preempt all malpractice
claims against participating medical providers?” by looking to the general
structure or purpose of the statute.49
But what if a statute, constitution, or body of law leaves gaps that are too
broad to fill with a narrow, one-off decision? These situations may present a court
with a legal blank slate.
2. Definition and Explanation
In its most basic terms, a legal blank slate refers to a situation where formal
sources of law offer little to no guidance to courts in addressing a broad legal issue.
The paradigm legal blank slate requires 1) a legal question that calls for the
promulgation of a test or standard, and 2) a lack of useful formal guidance for
courts in shaping such a test or standard.
The first part of this definition refers to those legal issues that compel a court
See Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original
Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 10–11 (2015).
44 See Solum, supra note 1, at 520–23; RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2005).
45 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877,
894–98 (1996).
46 STRAUSS, supra note 37, at 38; POSNER, supra note 1, at 106–08.
47 See generally J. Gordon Christy, A Prolegomena to Federal Statutory Interpretation:
Identifying the Sources of Interpretive Problems, 76 MISS. L.J. 55 (2006); supra note 17, at 43.
48 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 187–88 (1996).
49 ERISA does not preempt all malpractice claims, although the relevant statutory
language in context is indeterminate on the matter. See e.g., Moreno v. Health Partners
Health Plan, 4 F. Supp. 2d 888 (D. Ariz. 1998); Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113 (D. Md.
1996); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Ill. 1994); see generally Christy,
supra note 47, at 121.
43
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to promulgate a standard or test that will govern future cases. Establishing such
standards may be necessary so that future courts can address related questions
consistently and equitably and private parties can determine the general legal
rules that will apply to their conduct.50 In these situations, courts are not simply
asked to decide whether a rule applies to a certain situation or whether a particular
thing fits into a statutory category. Instead, they are called upon to develop a test
that potentially covers a broad range of conduct. Often, the parties to a litigation
will expressly ask the court to formulate such a test, and will offer competing
proposals for particular tests that the court should adopt.51 In other situations,
deciding a case may require a court to define a concept or give a rationale for an
outcome where the definition or rationale given are highly likely to guide future
cases involving similar issues. For example, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the
Court had to define the concept of a “hostile and abusive work environment,” and
in doing so it formulated a test for future courts to apply. 52
The second part of the definition of legal blank slates refers to situations where
the traditional formal sources of law—text, context, legislative history, intent,
historical practice, precedent—provide no useful guidance to courts on how to
address a legal issue. This may occur because these formal sources are
indeterminate, or because any formal guidance they might give has been rejected
by widely accepted precedent or rendered obsolete by developments in related
legal areas.53 For example, when courts had to decide whether a restriction on the
time, place, or manner of speaking violated the First Amendment, they had little
or no formal guidance to assist them.54 The text does not address such situations,
the drafting history is silent, and historical context sheds virtually no light on the
subject.55 By contrast, and even though the issue was controversial for decades,
the text and purpose of the First Amendment offered at least some guidance to
courts trying to determine whether viewpoint-based speech legislation should be

See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 11 (1988).
See infra text accompanying notes 292–295. In a non-blank-slate context, see, e.g., Brief
for the Petitioner, Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (No. 75-871), 1976 WL 181403,
at *9–11 (in assessing a suggestive photo line-up, the court should use a totality of the
circumstances test); Brief for Respondent, Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (No. 75871), 1976 WL 181405, at *12–29 (in assessing a suggestive photo line-up, the court should
use a per se rule).
52 See infra Part II.D. In the recent criminal case Maslenjak v. United States, the Court noted
that it was important for the Court to formulate a test because “[t]he Government needs
to know what prosecutions to bring; defendants need to know what defenses to offer,
and district courts need to know how to instruct juries.” 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1927 n.4 (2017).
53 See infra Part I.C.1.
54 See infra Part II.A.
55 See id.
50
51
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generally prohibited.56
It should be acknowledged that few “blank slates” will ever be perfectly
blank. A law’s history, text, or purpose may at least provide general inspiration
for a way forward, even if the guidance and constraint they offer is negligible.57
Thus formal sources of law need not be utterly silent for a situation to constitute a
legal blank slate. When these sources provide minimal formal constraint or
guidance, that is sufficient to identify a situation as a legal blank slate.
Indeed, the “blankness” of a legal situation is a spectrum rather than a
binary—the above description of the various kinds of legal indeterminacy
demonstrates as much. Legal issues range from those clearly determined by
existing formal law, through those where the law is controversial or ambiguous,
to those where courts must fill small gaps in existing law, all the way to blank
slates, where courts must fill larger gaps with minimal formal guidance. This
Article focuses on the extreme end of this spectrum, where formal law largely
fades from view and blankness prevails. But examining these end cases can yield
insights that apply to the entire spectrum, as discussed in Part III.

3. How Blank Slates Arise
To fully understand legal blank slates, it helps to understand how they
originate. Legal blank slates can arise in a variety of ways. For example, when a
court fills a narrow statutory gap by deciding that a type of conduct violates a
statute, it may open up a broader gap that it later needs to fill. Case 1 may simply
decide that an owner’s manipulative sales techniques violate a statute that
prohibits “deceptive business practices” in retail stores. But soon enough, case 2
presents the question of what exactly “manipulative sales techniques” are, and the
court is compelled to give guidance to future courts and to store owners regarding
what is not allowed in the context of retail sales.58 This definitional question will
likely present a blank slate, as the court must flesh out a concept not directly
addressed in the text or history of the statute. Similar blank slates may arise in the
common law context if a court fills a precedential gap with a broad concept and

See, e.g., Am. Commc’ns Ass’n, C.I.O., v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 394–95 (1950) (conceding
that an anti-communism provision in the Taft-Hartley Act would be unconstitutional
under a textual interpretation of the First Amendment).
57 E.g., Merrill, supra note 17, at 43 (recommending that courts facing difficult questions of
interpretation use general purpose to construct a workable meaning).
58 This hypothetical situation is analogous to the Civil Rights Act scenario discussed infra
Part II.D.
56

11

Blank Slates
then future courts are asked to define that concept.
Blank slates might also arise in the common law context if a case presents a
broad question so new that no existing precedent provides a determinative
analogy. Courts in such a situation may feel compelled to promulgate a new rule
or standard to address the novel, important question. This could occur, for
instance, if courts hear cases involving advanced technologies that present unique
legal issues.59 Still, such cases are likely to be rare—the common law tends to
evolve gradually and in small increments.60
Blank slates may also occur when Congress writes a statute in terms so openended and abstract that they essentially amount to a command to courts to develop
a new body of common law to govern the issue. Many courts and commentators
consider the Sherman Act to be such a statute,61 along with statutes such as Section
198362 and the Taft-Hartley Act.63 Such statutes can pose broad, novel questions
on which there is no statutory guidance and no useful common-law analogue.
Perhaps the most significant blank slates are those that arise over time as
economic, cultural, or technological changes pose questions not contemplated by
the framers of a law or covered by any formal sources. For instance, the process
of societal change is likely the primary source of the blank slate surrounding the
scope of the Fourth Amendment.64 The Founders had little reason to specify the
scope of the “search” concept, because most Founding-era searches were easy to
identify—they involved physical violation of the home or other property. 65
Modern search questions only arose in the radically changed context of the
Self-driving cars or advanced robots may present such issues, even though some
analogies to prior technologies or entities can be drawn. See, e.g., Frederick D. Page &
Norma M. Krayem, Are You Ready for Self-Driving Vehicles?, 29 Intell. Prop. & Tech. L.J. 14
(2017) (outlining the multitude of legal and ethical issues raised by self-driving cars).
Likewise, new technologies can pose unique questions of patentability or
copyrightability not addressed by existing intellectual property statutes or precedents.
See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Narratives of Gene Patenting, 43 F.S.U. L. REV. 1133, 1192–
94 (2016) (describing the primary arguments and concepts typically used in cases
involving novel technological categories).
60 See Stone, supra note 38, at 6–7.
61 See 15 U.S.C. § 1; Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899-900
(2007); (“From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law
statute.”); Frank Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983).
62 See Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
421-22 (1989).
63 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1007, 1052 (1989).
64 See infra Part II.C.
65 See Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV.
67, 70–76 (2012).
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Twentieth Century, when police officers could use listening devices to record
private activities or access intimate conversations transmitted through wires over
long distances. Neither the telephone, nor the “bug,” nor even the professional
police officer existed in 1791.66 Blank slates arising from societal and technological
changes may appear with increasing frequency in constitutional law, as we move
ever further away from the world in which the Constitution was drafted.
Substantial contextual change can also lead to the widespread rejection of
those formal sources of law that might otherwise provide guidance. When certain
interpretations of the text or history of a law would undermine the core values of
the law if applied in a radically changed context, those interpretations are likely to
be discarded. This may leave courts without guidance on future issues. For
instance, a strict textual interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s “persons,
houses, papers, and effects” clause, which would allow the government to wiretap
and bug citizens without constitutional check, has been almost universally
rejected.67 Likewise, interpreting the First Amendment to bar only prior restraints,
as its framers likely contemplated, has been near-universally rejected for almost a
century.68 This widely accepted departure from historical practice raised new
legal questions not addressed by existing formal sources, potentially creating
several substantial blank slates.
Thus legal blank slates can arise for a variety of reasons, and in every area of
law, from constitutional law to common law tort cases. To this point, however,
scholars have not identified or considered blank slates separately from the far
more common phenomena of legal indeterminacy and legal gaps. The next section
analyzes how courts can optimally address legal blank slates.

In the Founding era, there were no police officers in the colonies or early states.
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 620.
(1999). There was essentially no proactive law enforcement, and constables were
generally poor civilians who did a year-long tour of duty with the goal of keeping the
peace, not investigating crime. Id. at 620–22. The Framers did not directly address
warrantless searches in part because constables were unlikely to search without
warrants, lest they be sued or physically resisted. Id. at 625–26; Silas J. Wasserstrom &
Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L. J. 19,
82–83 (1988). As concerns about crime grew during the nineteenth century,
professionalized police departments formed. Davies, supra, at 725. Officers were given
more ex officio authority and greater legal protection against citizen resistance. Id. These
developments undermined the effectiveness of trespass actions against individual
officers as a means of enforcing Fourth Amendment values. Id.
67 See infra Part II.C.1.b.
68 Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166, 2198–99
(2015).
66
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B. A Theory of Blank Slates
The previous section identified the phenomenon of legal blank slates and
examined their origins. It may be useful to courts facing blank slates to know
precisely the situation they are in and to examine how courts previously addressed
similar situations.69 But a coherent theory of blank slates and how courts can
optimally address them is also necessary.
Existing writing on legal indeterminacy does not address blank slates, and
thus offers little insight into how courts should develop a legal standard or test in
the absence of formal guidance. Rather, scholars and judges who have
acknowledged legal gaps have generally thought of judges filling gaps as acting
in a legislative capacity.70 As such, judges can make policy largely according to
what they think best,71 consulting their moral intuitions,72 personal experience,73
policy judgments,74 or emotions.75
This may be an accurate enough account of how judges will fill gaps in oneoff cases. It may even describe how they will formulate tests and standards when
confronted with legal blank slates. But it offers little guidance as to how judges
should approach such situations, or how to formulate tests that will effectively
guide future cases and yield optimal outcomes. We lack a prescriptive theory of
See infra Part II.
E.g., RAZ, supra note 1, at 197–99 (1979). Ronald Dworkin takes a philosophically
different approach to doctrinal indeterminacy that ultimately offers judges similar
advice. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 124, 128 (1977) (describing the
central role of political and personal convictions in Dworkinian adjudication). Dworkin
argues that judges should address difficult legal questions by choosing the outcome that
fits best with the overarching narrative or theory of law and with political morality. Id. at
107; DWORKIN, supra note 32, at 138–43. Although Dworkinian judges can look to the
broad narrative of law and strive for normative consistency, this general approach to law
does not specifically address blank slates or how courts should formulate legal tests in
the absence of doctrinal guidance. Indeed, the choice structure described below may
help Dworkinian judges determine which test or standard fits best with existing legal
and normative structures.
71 See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 1, at 197. This prescription for legal indeterminacy is shared
not only by legal positivists like H.L.A. Hart and pragmatists like Richard Posner, but
also by more formalist theorists. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 17, at 43; Charles Fried, Two
Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court’s Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L.
REV. 755, 777–78 (1963).
72 EISENBERG, supra note 50, at 148.
73
POSNER, supra note 1, at 94-95 (citing Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the
Supreme Court: Some Intersections between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169,
260–261 (1968)).
74 STRAUSS, supra note 37, at 38.
75 POSNER, supra note 1, at 106.
69
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blank slates, one that could assist courts as they create legal tests with minimal
formal guidance.
The legal questions that present blank slates are indeed likely to be difficult.
They arise in the context of a legal dispute in unfamiliar territory, as courts weigh
competing considerations and assess various potential tests to fill a doctrinal gap.
In such situations, definitive moral or deontological imperatives are unlikely to be
found. Even in the constitutional context, blank slates rarely involve the core
substance of constitutional rights. Rather, blank slates often occur when courts
must specify the boundaries of a right or resolve ancillary issues that relate to
rights. And in common law and statutory contexts, absolute rights tend not to be
involved at all.
What remains in most cases is a situation typical of decisionmaking in
general—a balancing of competing considerations. Although many of our
decisions are automatic or habitual,76 we regularly make our conscious decisions—
should I go to the gym? should I have a beer? should I go to this store or that
one?—by informally weighing various considerations and choosing what we
think will produce the best outcomes.77
A court facing a legal blank slate is in a similar situation. It is presented with
a legal question that reflects an underlying normative balance: in the absence of
legislative commands or other formal guidance and given the considerations
favoring one outcome and the considerations favoring an opposing outcome,
which outcome should prevail? This innate balance is present even if courts avoid
confronting it.78 Indeed, avoiding it may often be the best option, as the next
Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 920–22
(2015).
77 E.g., Fried, supra note 71, at 764–65 (describing the informal balancing that we apply to
everyday decisionmaking).
78 Scholars and judges have long recognized that a normative balance underlies even
bright-line rules. See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balancing Significant
Interests, 45 Hastings L.J. 825, 845–46 (1994) (“[B]alancing is ubiquitous within what we
describe as rules—indeed, it is hard to avoid.”); Henkin, supra note 25, at 1023–24
(describing the normative balance that underlies even clear constitutional rules); Hugo
Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 879 (1960) (“Of course the decision to
provide a constitutional safeguard for a particular right, such as the fair trial
requirements of the Fifth And Sixth Amendments and the right of free speech protection
of the First, involves a balancing of competing interests.”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897) (“[J]udges themselves have failed
adequately to recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The
duty is inevitable, and the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with
such considerations is simply to leave the very ground and foundation of judgments
inarticulate, and often unconscious, as I have said.”).
76
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section discusses.

1. Three Approaches to Blank Slates
Courts confronting legal blank slates might pursue one of three general
strategies. First, they can engage in direct normative balancing, instructing future
courts to expressly weigh the competing considerations at issue. Second, they can
use a proxy value, which is meant to capture the normative values at stake but is
easier for judges to apply. Finally, they can “choose not to choose” by refusing to
promulgate any test to fill the blank slate and resolving the case without a
substantive explanation or rationale. This section describes these general
strategies in more detail.
Direct Normative Balancing --- Addressing a blank slate with direct normative
balancing entails establishing a balancing test that encompasses important
considerations on each side of an issue and weighs them against each other.
Subsequent cases would then employ the same balancing test to resolve similar
questions. Over time, however, rules might be promulgated to address particular
situations, as courts identify areas where normative balancing consistently yields
one outcome instead of another. This process of “rulification” is similar to that
observed in common law contexts evolving over time.79
The creation of a normative balancing test generally requires courts to identify
the core normative or policy considerations surrounding a legal question.80
Concrete factors that can be evaluated with real-world data are, all else equal,
preferable to vague or abstract values.81 In order to create a workable test, courts
will generally exclude considerations that are less important or are particularly
difficult to understand or quantify.82 Nonetheless, one of the primary benefits of
direct normative balancing is that it allows judges to take account of the
complexities of an issue and the many factors that might determine its optimal
See Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 654–55 (2014).
See Frank N. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 16,
22–25 (1988) (discussing how balancing calls for judges to be open about the
considerations that drive their decisions and laying out various principles of good
balancing).
81 See Gottlieb, supra note 78, at 858.
82 See Coffin, supra note 80, at 25 (discussing the dangers of making balancing tests too
fact-specific to offer guidance to future cases); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law
in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 977–78 (1987) (highlighting the problem of
potential underinclusiveness in balancing tests). Courts typically cannot evaluate and
discuss every factor that might potentially bear on a decision, and even “totality of the
circumstances” tests are unlikely to consider every relevant circumstance. See id.; Coffin,
supra note 80, at 25.
79
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outcome. Another benefit is that it encourages transparency, directing judges to
give a full account of their decisionmaking process and subjecting that account to
public and professional appraisal.83 This judicial openness can reveal judges’
faulty assumptions, illogic, or biases—or offer convincing guidance for future
courts to follow.84 The balancing test used in First Amendment law to evaluate
restrictions on the speech of government employees is an example of a direct
normative balancing test that addresses a legal blank slate.85 It explicitly weighs
the interests of employees in commenting on public matters against the interests
of the government as an employer in efficiently providing public services.86
Likewise, courts engage in direct normative balancing when determining the
scope of the dormant Commerce Clause.87
Proxy Values --- A proxy value, or a “false target,” is a standard or rule that is
meant to stand in for the normative balance underlying a legal blank slate. The
proxy value is intended to embody the key normative considerations, to capture
what is essential about the normative question being decided. Rather than directly
addressing the normative values at issue, courts can focus on a proxy standard
and decide the case according to whether the standard is met. This will generally
make the inquiry more conceptually simple, and it may reduce courts’ decision
costs, depending on how easy the standard is to adjudicate.88 Indeed,
administrability and conceptual clarity are the primary benefits of proxy values
relative to direct normative balancing.
The Katz test is an example of a proxy test—it directs courts to look at people’s
expectations of privacy as a proxy for the normative question of whether they
should have privacy. Thus, at least in most cases, courts do not directly balance
privacy interests against law enforcement interests in order to determine the
Fourth Amendment’s scope.89 If an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, that is normally sufficient to establish that the Fourth Amendment applies
Coffin, supra note 80, at 24–25.
Id. Public and peer scrutiny of such decisions can also result in improved decisions
over time, encouraging consensus and deterring decisions based on flawed or biased
reasoning. Id.; see also Wallace Mendelson, On the Meaning of the First Amendment:
Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REV. 821, 825-26 (1962) (“Open balancing compels a
judge to take full responsibility for his decisions, and promises a particularized, rational
account of how he arrives at them … Moreover, this approach should make it more
difficult for judges to rest on their predispositions without ever subjecting them to the
test of reason. It should also make their accounts more rationally auditable.”).
85 See infra Part II.A.
86
Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
87
See infra Part II.B.
88 On average, proxy tests will have lower decision costs than normative balancing tests.
89 One notable exception is Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984).
83
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without further inquiry.90 The proxy dictates the scope of the Amendment.
Likewise, in medical malpractice cases, courts typically use the industry standard
of care as a proxy and do not directly balance the burdens and harms of particular
medical precautions.91
Proxy tests can be inspired by history, or the general purpose of a law, or a
sense of “best fit” with existing legal structures, or broader normative theories.92
For instance, Katz was likely inspired in part by the Fourth Amendment’s general
purpose of protecting citizens’ privacy from arbitrary governmental intrusion.93
But this abstract idea did not compel the particular Katz test and did not offer
guidance as to how courts should determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment
in particular cases. History or fit or broad normative theories may likewise inspire
proxy tests, but, in a blank slate situation, they do not compel them.
Choosing Not to Choose --- A Court facing a blank slate could choose to do
nothing. That is, it can decline to promulgate a test even though the situation
seems to call for one in order to give guidance to affected parties and promote
consistency and equality in future adjudication. A court could simply reach a
decision that a given set of facts constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, or a
“hostile and abusive work environment” under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
without explaining why.
This approach would be most feasible for district courts, which can generally
decline to issue opinions and whose opinions are not technically binding on future
courts.94 And this approach might be justified on the grounds that higher courts,
or any court deciding later in time, may be better suited than the initial trial court
to formulate the optimal test. Appellate courts may have institutional advantages
(fewer cases, multi-judge panels, more experienced judges) that make them better
E.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,
98–99 (1990); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988).
91
E.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 873 (Miss. 1985); see generally Michelle M. Mello, Of
Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 654–661 (2001).
92 See William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment,
129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1837–50 (2016) (proposing positive law as a proxy for Fourth
Amendment scope inspired in part by history, structural fit, and purpose); D WORKIN,
supra note 32, at 134–42 (describing the concept of narrative fit as a means of reaching
“right” answers in otherwise irresolubly ambiguous legal disputes); Solum, supra note 43,
at 5 (discussing proposals that indeterminate constitutional questions might be resolved
based on “normative considerations that are not fully determined by the communicative
content of the constitutional text”).
93 See infra notes 243–245 and accompanying text.
94 See, e.g., Fishman & Tobin, Inc. v. Tropical Shipping & Const. Co., Ltd., 240 F.3d 956, 965
(11th Cir. 2001); In Re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
90
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suited for establishing standards to govern future cases. Courts deciding later in
time may also have an advantage because they can examine earlier case outcomes
for useful patterns or other data. For instance, if nineteen cases have found a
search when government agents track people with drones, and only one case has
not found a search, then the court hearing the twenty-first case could confidently
promulgate a rule that tracking people with drones is a search. In this process,
similar to the classic common law process, courts could slowly create rules to
govern a body of law. The downside of this approach in blank slate situations is
that it leaves affected parties without guidance and risks chaos and inconsistency
among courts—what happens if the first twenty cases are split 10-10? Moreover,
a similar process of rulification is likely to occur if courts take a direct normative
balancing approach, and that approach has the added benefits of transparency and
at least some guidance for courts and affected parties.95
Choosing not to choose is also difficult for appellate courts, which generally
issue written opinions explaining their reasoning, especially in cases of first
impression.96 If an appeals court writes an opinion, it is likely that its reasoning
and mode of analysis will be followed by lower courts even if it does not expressly
establish a test or standard.97 Courts may thus create tests inadvertently.
Interestingly, something similar happened to the majority in Katz, which did not
set out any test for the Fourth Amendment’s scope going forward.98 The famous
Katz test comes instead from Justice Harlan’s solo concurrence.99 Harlan’s
ultimately flawed approach became dominant because courts faced with difficult
decisions sought guidance from a legal test, and Harlan’s was the only one
available.100

See infra Part III.B.
See, e.g., D.C. Cir. R. 36(c) (stating that “[i]t is the policy of this court to publish
opinions and explanatory memoranda that have general public interest,” and providing
that an opinion “will be published” if the case meets one of several criteria, including
“case[s] of first impression or the first case to present the issue in this court.”); 1st. Cir. R.
36.0 (stating that “the court thinks it desirable that opinions be published,” a policy that
can only be overcome in those cases where the opinion does not address novel facts or
law or otherwise provide relevant guidance to future litigants). Appeals court opinions
are especially useful in difficult or novel cases, because they can guide lower courts and
provide other appeals courts with reasoning to either agree with or critique.
97 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (1989).
98 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
99 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
100 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 56, 113 (1997) (describing the necessity of legal tests). For examples of appeals
courts relying on Harlan’s concurrence for guidance soon after Katz, see, e.g., Gov’t of
95
96

19

Blank Slates
Choosing not to choose thus likely works best as a temporary solution
primarily available to district court judges. Judges who have no insight into a
particular legal issue, or who doubt their institutional or personal capacity to
address it, can resolve the case without an opinion and leave it to future courts to
fill in the blank slate. This might minimize poorly reasoned precedents and allow
courts to self-sort according to their interest in a legal question and capacity for
addressing it. Legislatures might also eventually address legal questions, bringing
to bear their expertise in rule promulgation.101 But, at least in the statutory and
common law contexts, legislatures are equally able to weigh in after courts have
acted—indeed, legislatures may learn from existing legal tests, modifying or
correcting them based on the lessons of experience.102
What happens when a court does attempt to address a broad legal question
for which there is little formal guidance? The next section examines how courts
should choose between direct normative balancing and proxy values when faced
with a legal blank slate.

2. Choosing an Approach
Selecting a test to fill in a legal blank slate is both difficult and important. If
adopted by other courts, the test will govern adjudication of a broad legal issue for

Virgin Islands v. Berne, 412 F.2d 1055, 1061 (3d Cir. 1969); Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621, 625
(9th Cir. 1969).
101 Of course, the wait for legislatures to address unresolved legal issues may be a very
long wait. Legislatures may be reluctant to involve themselves in establishing doctrinal
tests or may focus on more politically salient issues. Further, the substantial enactment
costs of legislation and the preferences of entrenched interest groups combine to produce
a powerful bias in favor of legislative inaction. See, e.g., FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, ET AL.,
LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND WHY 24–26, 45 (2009). This
legislative status-quo bias is likely increasing over time, as political parties grow more
polarized and the use of filibusters becomes routine. See, e.g., Jody Freeman & David B.
Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 14 (2014).
102 For example, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 US 55 (1980), the Supreme Court upheld
Mobile’s electoral system under the Voting Rights Act, interpreting the Act as only
prohibiting purposeful discrimination. In 1982, in response to the holding, Congress
amended the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to establish a discriminatory effects test and
making clear that a statutory violation did not require discriminatory purpose. See 96
Stat. 134; S. Rep. No. 97-417 at 36–40 (describing the practical flaws in the Supreme
Court’s interpretation and the resulting bad consequences, which helped motivate
Congress to amend and improve the test).
In the constitutional context, legislatures may pass laws that embody an
interpretation of the Constitution and help to fill in its gaps, but ultimately interpreting
the Constitution and addressing its indeterminacies is the province of the judiciary. See
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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the foreseeable future. So the choice is worth considering in some detail.
As discussed above, the foundational strategic question is whether the test
should be a direct normative balancing test or whether courts should use a proxy
value that stands in for the underlying normative balance. There are several
considerations that bear on this question. This section describes these factors, in
descending order of importance.
First, how likely is it that a proxy value can capture the underlying normative balance
at issue? The more that a proxy fails to encompass important normative
considerations, the less effective it will be in optimally resolving legal disputes.
Such proxies may, for instance, resolve cases on grounds that are irrelevant to the
values at stake, leading to absurd results.103
There are three sub-factors that courts can examine when assessing how
effective proxies are likely to be in a given situation. One is the complexity of the
underlying concept. In general, the more complex the legal issue, the more
difficult it will be to effectively capture it with a proxy value.104 For instance, blank
slates associated with the First Amendment may present especially complex
issues, because issues of speech implicate numerous competing values and
difficult definitional questions.105 In such situations, it will be difficult to create a
proxy test that captures all of the fundamental interests at stake. Accordingly,
normative balancing tests are likely to be a more effective approach. Indeed,
balancing tests are common in First Amendment law, especially in areas where
courts had to promulgate tests with little textual or historical guidance.106
Another consideration is how stable a legal question is likely to be over time.
The more likely it is that the context or normative calculus of a legal question will
change over time, the less likely that a proxy value will effectively resolve the
question in future cases. For instance, the use of property intrusion as a proxy
standard for Fourth Amendment “search” failed in part because technology and
law enforcement changed so radically that property was no longer an effective

For an example of a proxy rule causing cases to be decided on irrelevant grounds, see
infra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
104 A concept might be complex if there are numerous, ambiguous, and/or conflicting
values on either side of the issue. Simple concepts will generally not implicate many
such values. A concept might also be simple if most of the normative considerations
point strongly in one direction. So if the interests on one side of a normative balance are
weighty and numerous, and those on the other side are trivial, that would reduce the
complexity of the underlying issue and make it more likely that a proxy could capture it.
105 See infra Part II.A.
106 See id.
103
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proxy for the normative calculus underlying the concept of a “search.”107 While it
is difficult to foresee future change, some areas of law are more stable than others.
In areas like government surveillance, where technological and social change has
repeatedly destabilized proxy standards, balancing approaches may be more
effective, holding all else equal.108
A third consideration is the breadth of the legal issue. The broader the legal
question the court is addressing, and the more different types of cases that will be
governed by a test, the less likely it is that a proxy value will be able to effectively
resolve the cases. In other words, proxies will tend to perform best when
addressing relatively narrow questions. Thus it may be difficult to forge a proxy
to cover the entirety of all Fourth Amendment search questions. But a proxy may
be optimal for addressing narrower questions of what police conduct is reasonable
in particular search contexts.109
Second, how much easier is a potential proxy test to administer? The more a proxy
value reduces decision costs and ambiguity in adjudication, the more likely it is to
be a better choice than direct normative balancing. Thus, a proxy test may be
quicker and easier to apply than a direct balancing test. In addition, a proxy may
be easier to grasp conceptually than a normative test. A simpler, clearer legal
concept may improve adjudication even if it does not reduce concrete adjudication
costs like judicial time and effort.110
Not every proxy will reduce decision costs—certain proxies may be more
difficult to adjudicate than a balancing test.111 Likewise, the clarity and
concreteness of legal proxies will vary substantially. Some will be far easier to
grasp than a normative balancing approach,112 some will be only slightly more
tractable,113 and some may be even harder to grasp conceptually than a balancing

See supra text accompanying note 67.
This is also likely true of areas of law that often address transformative new
technologies, like intellectual property. Areas like real property law or torts have
certainly undergone transformative changes over time, but may be relatively stable and
less sensitive to technological change.
109 See infra Part II.E.
110 Tokson, supra note 76, at 912–16 (discussing the difference between time and effort
costs and the cognitive costs of processing new concepts).
111 See Richard Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 313, 320–26 (noting
that, in many cases, using civil law as a proxy for the Fourth Amendment’s scope would
lead to confusion and indeterminacy).
112 See infra Part II.E.
113 See infra Part II.D.
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test.114
Third, how likely are courts to be able to obtain and process the information necessary
for effective normative balancing? The more information relevant to a normative
balance that courts can collect and process, the more effective a direct balancing
test will be. For instance, if courts are attempting to decide whether the statewide
benefits of a regulation outweigh any burdens on interstate commerce, it will help
to have government studies on the projected benefits and costs of the regulation,
private or academic reports on its effects, general economics treatises, statistics on
interstate trade flows in a particular industry, and other sources of relevant
information.115
Such information may come from several sources. The government’s briefs
will generally contain relevant government statistics or reports. Briefs in general
may contain “legislative facts” concerning social science, statistics, and economic
data that can help courts address normative and policy issues.116 Parties may call
expert witnesses who collect or cite the relevant academic literature and prepare
their own reports. Courts also have their own information-gathering capacities
and may have access to useful “systemic facts” in frequently-litigated areas like
criminal justice and procedure.117
When important aspects of a normative balance have been studied and courts
are likely to obtain the relevant information from one of the above sources, it is
more likely that courts can effectively apply a normative balancing test. If the
relevant information cannot be accessed or there exists no concrete information on
an issue, then courts may struggle to balance competing considerations. For
instance, information regarding national security programs or the international
effects of U.S. policies may be difficult to access.
Courts’ ability to obtain relevant information is not the only important
consideration; they must also be able to understand and apply the information.
Judges may not be competent to deal with advanced econometric or technological
data. In some cases, additional information may actually reduce the quality of
decisions by overloading judges and making it more difficult to identify important

The Katz proxy test as applied has become extremely conceptually complex,
incorporating at least four overlapping models of decisionmaking, including policy
balancing as well as several others. See Kerr, supra note 3, at 507–22.
115 See infra Part II.B.
116 E.g., Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO L.J. 1, 30–31 (2013).
117 Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2068–70 (2016).
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data.118 So the type and quality of information available, and not just its quantity,
will be important in assessing whether courts are likely to effectively assess a
normative balance.
Integrating the factors. In some cases, the above considerations will clearly
weigh in favor of either direct balancing or a proxy value test. The paradigm
balancing test situation is one that involves broad, complex issues on which there
are helpful and available legislative or systemic facts. The paradigm proxy test
situation occurs when an issue is relatively narrow and straightforward, relevant
data is unavailable, and a proxy value exists that would be substantially easier to
administer than a balancing test.
Most situations will not be so clear-cut. A potential proxy test may be easier
to apply, yet the underlying issue may be so broad and complex that a proxy is
unlikely to effectively represent the underlying normative balance. In general, the
ability of the proxy to capture the normative balance will be the most important
consideration. A proxy that fails to encompass fundamental values is likely to
generate error costs that dwarf any benefits from easier decisionmaking.119 But, in
some contexts, a proxy value that is only moderately successful at capturing a
normative balance may be optimal if it is far more administrable or if information
vital to normative balancing is unavailable.
In general, information availability is less likely than the other factors to be a
definitive consideration, in part because some useful legislative and systemic
information is likely to be available for almost any substantial legal or policy
question. Legal scholarship and other academic research often addresses novel
issues and may be especially helpful to courts in cases where other sources of
relevant information are scarce.120 Nonetheless, information availability is a
substantial factor in choosing between balancing and proxy regimes—especially
when the decision is otherwise a close call.
This section has offered three key factors for courts to consider when choosing
between a direct normative balancing test and a proxy value test. This meta-test

E.g., Mark I. Hwang & Jerry W. Lin, Information dimension, information overload and
decision quality, 25 J. INFO. SCI. 213 – 218 (1999); Gottlieb, supra note 78, at 858.
119 See Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment Privacy, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 139,
194 (2016) (describing how arbitrary standards for Fourth Amendment scope can lead to
absurd results); Re, supra note 111, at 318 (discussing the arbitrariness of a positive law
test for the Fourth Amendment’s scope).
120 This may be one explanation for the empirical finding that the Supreme Court
“disproportionately uses legal scholarship when cases are … more difficult to decide”.
Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the Supreme Court’s Use
of Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 1016 (2012).
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does not encompass every consideration that might possibly bear on the
decision.121 In most cases, however, examining how well a proxy can capture the
underlying balance, how much easier the proxy is to administer, and whether
courts can obtain information relevant to balancing, will point courts towards the
optimal choice.

3. Distinguishing and Incorporating Rules vs. Standards
The choice between normative balancing and proxy values is similar in some
ways to the choice between rules and standards. Like any choice between two
legal regimes, it involves comparing decision costs and error costs, and the factors
described above are intended to help courts make this comparison.122 But the two
queries differ in many ways, and this section discusses their differences. It then
incorporates some of the insights of the rules and standards literature into the
choice between normative balancing and proxy approaches.
Balancing tests are a type of standard, one that weighs several factors against
each other in order to yield a conclusion.123 But proxy tests can be standards too.

For instance, it may be useful for courts to consider the importance of the average
decision in a particular legal area. If reaching an accurate conclusion is especially
important in terms of the number of people affected, economic value, national security,
etc., then courts have reason to incur substantial decision costs in order to minimize
erroneous decisions. See Gottlieb, supra note 78, at 856 (discussing optimal
decisionmaking strategies). Accordingly, a legal test that is costly to apply but more
likely to produce correct outcomes would be optimal in situations where the average
legal case is likely to be important. Direct normative balancing tests may be more likely
to produce correct decisions (along with high decision costs), and so may be optimal in
high-importance contexts. However, this is complicated by the fact that sometimes
normative balancing tests will produce more errors than proxy tests, such as when there
is little available information relevant to the normative balance and there is an effective
and concrete proxy value available. Further, some proxy values will carry higher
decision costs than balancing tests, such as when a proxy standard is difficult to
administer or has many complicated sub-layers. See supra note 111 and accompanying
text. The importance of a particular legal issue may also be controversial and difficult to
assess ex ante.
122 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Employment Discrimination: Age Discrimination and Sexual
Harassment, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 421, 423 (1999) (discussing the costs of
decisionmaking itself and the costs imposed by erroneous decisions).
123 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 60–
61 (1992) (Referring to the process of balancing as a “standard-like regime.”). There are
many other kinds of standards as well. E.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND
POLITICAL CONFLICT 27–33 (1996) (discussing different types of standards and standardlike decisionmaking regimes). A classic standard would be a law that prohibits cars from
driving at an “excessive” speed. Id. at 27.
121
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For instance, the Katz test’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” is a standard
rather than a bright-line rule.124 Likewise, the industry standards of care that
determine reasonableness in some areas of tort law tend to be standards rather
than bright-line rules.125
Indeed, bright-line rules are unlikely to be workable in many blank slate
situations. Proxy rules will be most appropriate for relatively simple blank slates
where normative considerations weigh heavily in favor of one outcome.126 In less
straightforward situations, courts using proxies are likely to favor proxy
standards.
If a potential proxy test is a bright-line rule, then it will have the advantages
of such rules, including predictability for private actors and consistency in
adjudication.127 It will also have the drawbacks, like over- or under-inclusiveness
and the potential for evasion and loopholes.128 These features of rules will be
relevant to the choice between the proxy test and a direct balancing regime. But
courts should still evaluate how well the potential proxy captures the normative
values at issue, what information is available to courts, and how much more
administrable the proxy is than a direct balancing test. Those questions need to be
addressed whether the proxy test is a rule or a standard.129
Finally, legal tests can have multiple layers that encompass both rules and
standards. A general, overarching test may incorporate several sub-tests that only
apply in certain circumstances. For instance, a high-level normative balancing
approach can, over time, yield numerous bright-line rules as courts “rulify” the
law by creating sub-rules to address particular situations.130 Negligence is a broad
legal standard, but it encompasses rules like the one-bite rule and the last-clearchance rule, among others.131 Thus a normative balancing approach might
ultimately produce a largely rule-based regime, with only very novel cases

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Tom Vesper, et al., Retail Stores, Risk, and Res Ipsa, TRIAL, August 2013, at 32,
34.
126 See infra Part II.E; see also supra note 104.
127 Sullivan, supra note 123, at 62–63.
128 Id.
129 Although considering the advantages and drawbacks of rules and standards as well as
those of balancing tests and proxies may be time-consuming and costly, it is likely
worthwhile. Cases that create new legal tests are frequently very important. See Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 595 (1992).
130 See Coenen, supra note 79, at 654–55.
131 E.g., Coogan v. Nelson, 92 A.3d 213, 218 (R.I. 2014); Fouts v. Builders Transp., Inc., 474
S.E.2d 746, 751 (Ga. App. 1996).
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addressed by a balancing test.132
Likewise, a high-level proxy rule can incorporate numerous complex
standards as it is applied. For example, some scholars have proposed a positive
law test for the Fourth Amendment’s scope, with a simple high-level rule: a police
action is a search only if it is tortious or it violates some existing law.133 But this
rule embodies a multitude of complicated and amorphous standards, because
many torts and laws use such standards.134 The positive law test is thus far more
difficult to apply than it might initially appear.135 When considering the
administrability of a proxy test, courts must take into account each layer of its
application, not just the highest level.

II. BLANK SLATES IN THE COURTS
Blank slates represent extreme cases of legal indeterminacy. Yet they are not
especially rare and can be found in a variety of areas of law. Often, they involve
significant public policy issues or shape some of our most fundamental
constitutional rights.136
This section gives an overview of legal blank slates and examines how courts
have addressed them. These summaries are necessarily brief and may not cover
every potential formal argument or creative historical claim. Nonetheless, the
situations described below presented courts with minimal formal guidance or
constraint in cases that called for a legal test to guide future decisions. These
examples can illuminate the different approaches courts can take to blank slates
and offer lessons for courts facing similar situations in the future.

A. Content-Neutral Restrictions on Speech
The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech raised numerous issues on
which text, history, and purpose presented little guidance. Courts have gradually
See infra Part III.C.
E.g., Baude & Stern, supra note 92, at 1829–33 (also proposing that actions that use the
unique authority of the government to obtain information be considered searches).
134 Re, supra note 111, at 320–21.
135 Id.
136 See infra Part II. Blank slates often arise as Courts address the Bill of Rights, which
frequently features vague, general text and very little direct legislative or other history.
See, e.g. Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 1032 (2011).
132
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filled in many of these blank slates over the course of the past century. Typically,
courts have done so with balancing tests, which are pervasive in First Amendment
law.137
The text of the First Amendment’s free speech clause prohibits “abridging the
freedom of speech”—a rather short phrase that is both abstract and ambiguous. 138
As David Strauss has noted, “[i]t is not obvious what constitutes an abridgement,
and it is not obvious what constitutes the freedom of speech.”139 About all that is
clear is that the First Amendment does not prohibit all abridgements of speech,
because laws regulating things like copyrights, espionage, and perjury are largely
unaffected by the First Amendment.140
The text does appear to limit the Amendment’s scope to laws made by
“Congress,”141 but courts have implicitly rejected any such limit, applying the
Amendment to state laws and judicial prior restraints.142 A contrary interpretation
would allow the states or the judiciary to restrict speech without constitutional
regulation—a potentially disastrous outcome in normative terms and one that
might undermine any meaningful “freedom of speech.” Thus the “Congress”
provision of the First Amendment has not been interpreted as a hard limit on the
scope of the constitutional right.
The general ambiguity of the First Amendment’s text is compounded by its
history. The legislative history of the Amendment sheds almost no light on its
E.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 386 (2009) (“[B]alancing tests generally prevail in First
Amendment analysis”); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV.
767, 779 (2001) (describing the pervasiveness of the “balancing-test approach” to the First
Amendment).
138 STRAUSS, supra note 37, at 57 (the text of the First Amendment “simply does not tell us
much”); Mendelson, supra note 84, at 821(“[T]he language of the first amendment is
highly ambiguous.”).
139 STRAUSS, supra note 37 at 57; see also, e.g., G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats,
Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 891
(2002) (“[T]he Amendment neither defines “speech” nor explains what kinds of laws
constitute “abridging” freedom of speech. The history of the Amendment is also
uninformative.”).
140 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to
Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 937 (1968); see also Robert Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 21 (1971) (explaining why a
reading of the First Amendment that prohibits any and all restraints on communication
“is, of course, impossible.”).
141 U.S. CONST. amend I.
142 See generally Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L.
REV. 1156, 1209 (1986) (analyzing the issue in detail). Following the incorporation of the
First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, courts
have also consistently applied the free speech guarantee to the states. Id. at 1210–11.
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scope or meaning, especially with respect to free speech.143 There are no records
of the Senate deliberations or the relevant ratification debates in the state
legislatures.144 The House debates are not illuminating either.145 Moreover, the
concept of freedom of speech, at least as a cognizable legal right, “had almost no
history as a concept or a practice prior to the [ratification of the] First Amendment
or even later.”146
In the early post-Founding period, the nature of the free speech right was
contested and unclear. Generally, the Amendment was understood to provide
total protection against prior restraints on speech but only limited protection
against after-the-fact punishment.147 The constitutionality of criminalizing
seditious speech was an open question, and political leaders tended to change
positions on sedition laws depending on whether they held power.148 Ultimately,
“[t]he framers seem to have had no coherent theory of free speech and appear not
to have been overly concerned with the subject.”149
In the 1960s, following a vigorous debate, the Supreme Court did interpret the
First Amendment to provide nearly absolute protection against viewpoint-based
restrictions on speech by private citizens.150 This is a plausible (though not
definitive) interpretation of the First Amendment’s protection of the “freedom of
speech”. But what about laws that only incidentally affect speech, or laws that
regulate the speech of government employees or commercial entities? Neither text
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE SUPREME COURT xvii (Terry Eastland, ed.) (2000).
Id.
145 Id.
146 LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 5 (1960) (“[Freedom of speech] developed
as an offshoot of freedom of the press, on the one hand, and on the other, freedom of
religion--the freedom to speak openly on religious matters. But as an independent
concept referring to a citizen's personal right to speak his mind, freedom of speech was a
very late development, virtually a new concept without basis in everyday experience and
nearly unknown to legal and constitutional history or to libertarian thought on either
side of the Atlantic prior to the First Amendment.”); cf. [Jud Campbell article in Yale L J]
(contending that free speech was known to late 18th-century legal elites as a largely nonenforceable natural rights concept).
147 E.g., Lakier, supra note 68, at 2179.
148 See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 84, at 822 (quoting both Jefferson’s endorsement of free
expression principles and his later, vigorous endorsement of prosecutions of opposition
journalists); Bork, supra note 140, at 22 (noting that libertarian views about the First
Amendment were not widely held even among Jeffersonians, and Jefferson himself
approved of state prosecutions for seditious libel).
149 Bork, supra note 140, at 22; see also Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV.
891, 898 (1949) (“The truth is, I think, that the framers had no very clear idea as to what
they meant by ‘the freedom of speech or of the press.’).
150 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
143
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nor any other formal source provides useful guidance on these ancillary questions.
Over the course of the last century, the Supreme Court has gradually filled in
these blank slates, typically using balancing tests. The Court’s first, tentative step
towards balancing came in 1939’s Schneider v. New Jersey, where the court struck
down ordinances banning the distribution of pamphlets in certain public places.151
The Court reasoned that “the purpose to keep the streets clean and of good
appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which prohibits a person
rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing to receive it”
and noted that narrower means like simply punishing littering could accomplish
the same goal.152 In 1940s cases, the Court expressly stated that “courts must
balance”153 and “weigh[]”154 community interests against free speech values in
cases involving time, place, or manner restrictions on speech.
In the 1980s, this balancing approach was formalized into an intermediate
scrutiny test. Under this test, a time, place, or manner restriction is valid if it is
“narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,” and “leave[s]
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.”155 The
intermediate scrutiny test is essentially a balancing test, 156 one that requires courts
to “strike an appropriate balance between achieving [government] goals and
protecting constitutional rights.”157 If the benefits of a non-content restriction are
minor, they will not justify incidental burdens on speech.158 If the benefits are
substantial, they likely will justify such burdens.159
Intermediate scrutiny and related balancing tests now cover a wide variety of
First Amendment issues. Regulations of commercial speech, symbolic conduct
(like burning a draft card), cable television, “adult” businesses, and charitable
solicitation are assessed under various forms and variants of the intermediate

308 U.S. 147, 162–65 (1939).
Id. at 162.
153 Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948).
154 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
155 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
156 E.g., Blocher, supra note 137, at 392.
157 Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also Casey v. City of Newport, R.I., 308
F.3d 106, 116 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Inescapably, the application of the narrow tailoring test
entails a delicate balancing judgment by the court”); Henderson v. Lujan, 964 F.2d 1179,
1184 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“Despite the seemingly mathematical character of the metaphor,
the Supreme Court in fact applies [the narrow-tailoring requirement] as a balancing
test”.).
158 Henderson, 964 F.2d at 1184–85.
159 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799–802 (1989).
151
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scrutiny test.160 Speech by government employees is governed by an unstructured
balancing test that aims “to arrive at a balance between the interests of the
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.”161
Blank slate theory can help to explain why balancing tests appear so
frequently in First Amendment law. The First Amendment embodies complex
normative questions involving the value of free expression and political
discourse.162 It is hard to locate a single value or proxy test to stand in for the
“exposition of ideas,”163 “the protection of political dissent,”164 “the advancement
of truth, science, morality, and arts in general,”165 and all the other values served
by the freedom of speech.166 Moreover, the blank slates covered by intermediate
scrutiny and related balancing tests tend to be broad, encompassing, for example,
all instances of commercial speech or all non-content speech regulations. In
situations like these, balancing is likely to be the optimal decisionmaking regime
and effective proxy values will be difficult to find.

B. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate “Commerce…among
the several States.”167 In the landmark cases of Gibbons v. Ogden168 and Willson v.
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. 169, the Supreme Court found that the states cannot
interfere with Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.170 The
Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 791–99 (2007).
161 Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
162 E.g., Blocher, supra note 137, at 393–97.
163 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
164 Blocher, supra note 137, at 396 (summarizing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
(1992)).
165 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
166 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 784–86 (1987); 1
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (1774) (noting the value of press freedom
of expression lies “in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of
Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its
consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officers are shamed
or intimidated, into more honourable and just modes of conducting affairs.’”).
167 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
168 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
169 27 U.S. 245 (1829).
170 E.g., id. at 252.
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Commerce Clause has power even “in its dormant state,” and this dormant
Commerce Clause prevents the states from usurping Congress’s commerce
powers.171
To be clear, the question of the dormant Commerce Clause’s existence is not
a blank slate. Textualism gives a clear answer: it does not exist.172 History and
intent may also provide useful guidance.173 Nor does the question call for a test—
either the dormant Commerce Clause exists or it does not. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has recognized the dormant Commerce Clause for nearly 200 years, and the
first precedents were written by Chief Justice Marshall himself. The question is
disputed, but the slate is far from blank.
For our purposes, suffice it to say that the dormant Commerce Clause is wellestablished law that continues to limit state power today. But, at least initially,
courts lacked guidance as to the scope or content of the dormant Clause.174 In
other words, it was unclear exactly when a state violated the dormant Commerce
Clause by unlawfully infringing on Congress’s powers. There was, of course, no
textual or legislative history evidence on the issue, and the Supreme Court’s
foundational precedents did not address the matter either.175 A blank slate arose.
The Supreme Court initially struggled to establish a test for determining
when a state law violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. It took its first steps in
Cooley v. Board of Warrens,176 noting that some subjects are “in their nature national,
or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation,”177 and these subjects
“require exclusive legislation by Congress.”178 The Court did not, however,
explain what these subjects might be or how to identify them and instead confined
its opinion to the precise question of laws regarding boat pilots.179 Cooley stated a
Id.
See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
173 Authorities dispute whether the Framers intended courts to strike down state laws
that impinge on Congress’s commerce power. Compare Brannon P. Denning,
Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce and the Legitimacy of the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37 (2006) (contending that ample historical
foundation exists to support the dormant Commerce Clause), with Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v.
Washington State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 264–65 (1987)(Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (contending that the Framers “almost certainly” did not intend to
create a dormant Commerce Clause).
174 See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 577 (1987).
175 See id.
176 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
177 Id. at 319.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 320.
171
172
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principle but did not promulgate a workable test.
In the decades after Cooley, the Court was likewise unable to establish a
concrete test, and the rationales of its cases were often inconsistent.180 Some cases
incorporated elements of balancing, considering whether state regulations served
a legitimate purpose without unreasonably burdening interstate commerce. 181 In
others, the Court looked to vague, undefined standards like whether a state
regulation was a “direct” or “indirect” burden on interstate commerce. 182
Ultimately, the “direct burden” standard could not withstand criticism from
dissenting Justices183 and scholars,184 and the Court dropped it in favor of directly
balancing the efficacy of a state law against the “national interest in keeping
interstate commerce free from interferences.”185 In modern cases, facially neutral
state regulations are evaluated under the “Pike balancing” test, under which such
regulations “will be upheld unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”186
The scope and content of the dormant Commerce Clause was a paradigmatic
blank slate, a legal question on which there was no direct history or intent and no
text at all. The Court struggled for over a century to elaborate a test for
determining whether a state regulation violated the dormant Clause. It repeatedly
failed to develop a workable proxy standard and ultimately adopted a balancing
test that expressly weighs local benefits against the harms imposed on interstate
commerce. The adoption of a balancing approach was perhaps less inevitable here
than in First Amendment law. The normative considerations underlying the
dormant Commerce Clause are largely practical and not as complex or as varied
as those behind the First Amendment.187 However, the blank slate here is broad,
potentially encompassing all state regulations that affect interstate commerce. It
See Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, 2 TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 11.6(a) (2016).
See, e.g., Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 151 (1902); Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465,
470–72 (1877); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).
182 Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 37 (1927).
183 Di Santo, 273 U.S. at 43 (Stone, J., dissenting).
184 Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1 (1940).
185 S. Pac. Co. v. State of Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 775–76 (1945).
186 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). State laws that overtly discriminate
against interstate commerce will be struck down “unless the discrimination is
demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism,” a standard
analogous to strict scrutiny. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992).
187 These considerations include the efficiency benefits of uniform federal regulation of
interstate trade, the informational and democratic benefits of allowing states to regulate
intrastate commerce, and the practical difficulty for Congress of policing every state
infringement on interstate commerce. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of
Delaware, 450 U.S. 662, 669–70 (1981); Henkin, supra note 25, at 1041.
180
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is also likely that courts will have access to high-quality information relevant to
the normative questions surrounding state regulations that affect interstate
commerce. The federal government, the states, and affected industry groups will
frequently be parties or amici in dormant Commerce Clause litigation and can
provide courts with information on the purported benefits of state regulations and
the potential impacts on interstate trade. Moreover, the Court attempted to create
proxy standards several times, and those proxies failed for lack of coherence and
administrability.188 In these circumstances, the direct normative balancing
adopted by the Court is probably the optimal approach.

C. The Scope of the Fourth Amendment
1. Text and Context
a. “Searches”
The text of the Fourth Amendment reads, in full:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.189
The Amendment plainly applies to “searches.” But what does “search” mean
here? The term is not defined in the text, and in general it has several possible
meanings.190 A search might be an abstract inquiry, like the “search [for] truth.”191
It might be any act of “seeking”192 or “looking for”193 something, like searching for
a place to eat. Alternatively, it could refer to the close “examination”194 of a thing,
like the examination of a letter.195 Or it could refer to the physical act of inspecting

See Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319; Di Santo, 273 U.S. at 37.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
190
Kerr, supra note 65, at 70.
191 Search n., NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(1828).
192 Search s. from the verb, SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(10th ed. 1792); Search, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (“scrutiny for the
purpose of finding a person or thing”).
193 A Search, NATHAN BAILEY, A UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1783).
194 JOHNSON, supra note 192; Search, v., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
195 Kerr, supra note 65, at 70; OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 194.
188
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a particular space,196 as in “to search the house for a book.”197
Yet the term “searches” is not just ambiguous in the abstract. In the context
of the Fourth Amendment, it is almost wholly indeterminate. From the earliest
days of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
text and structure of the Fourth Amendment to mean that “reasonable” searches
typically require a warrant and probable cause.198 Even the exceptions to this rule
generally require at least some quantum of suspicion.199 Thus the question of what
constitutes a Fourth Amendment search is a crucial one—“searches” usually
require probable cause, while the police can engage in non-searches without any
suspicion or any meaningful limits on the extent or duration of their
investigation.200 But the term “searches” gives no indication of how courts should
draw the line between a search and a non-search in this context.
Scholars have generally acknowledged that the scope of the term “search” is
not apparent from the text.201 One exception is Akhil Amar, who has suggested
that “search” should be construed broadly, covering any act of looking at

Id.
WEBSTER, supra note 191. One of several definitions provided by Johnson cites Milton
and refers to search as “Enquiry by looking into every suspected place.” J OHNSON, supra
note 192.
198 See, e.g., See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
393 (1914); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014). In practice, the warrant
requirement is subject to numerous exceptions, and courts now evaluate some
government searches against a pure reasonableness standard. E.g., United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 117–18 (2001); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
199 E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
200 The history of “non-search” surveillance is rife with examples of abuse and excessive
monitoring of citizens. See, e.g., ALEXANDER CHARNS, CLOAK AND GAVEL: FBI WIRETAPS,
BUGS, INFORMERS, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1992); Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive
Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY (May 11, 2006),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm.
201 See David Alan Sklansky, Two More Ways Not to Think About Privacy and the Fourth
Amendment, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 223 (2015) (“One can perhaps extract from this language
the traditional rule exempting searches of open fields from constitutional protection, but
not much else.”); Kerr, supra note 65, at 70 (“The ambiguity of the word ensures that a
wide range of concepts might plausibly define the meaning of searches.”); Wasserstrom
& Seidman, supra note 66, at 27 (“Indeed, it is hard to see how the Court could resolve the
issues it regularly confronts through a purely textual approach. For example, ‘search’ and
‘seizure’ are hardly self-defining. Although one can debate whether ‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’ gives them appropriate content, there can be no dispute that the
Court had to look outside the text to give them meaning.”).
196
197
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something or any gathering of information.202 But Amar does not address the
alternative definitions of “search” or offer any evidence to support choosing the
expansive definition.203 More importantly for our purposes, Amar’s interpretation
does not answer the core question presented in most Fourth Amendment scope
cases—when can the government obtain information on an individual when it
lacks any grounds to suspect her of a crime? Under Amar’s approach, the
government could search a person without suspicion if doing so were
“reasonable,” but reasonableness is an amorphous, “common-sense” concept that
gives no direct formal guidance.204 Amar’s approach would merely relocate the
blank slate from the “search” component of the Fourth Amendment to its
“reasonableness” component.
Moreover, Amar’s approach would require eliminating the warrant
requirement as a default rule.205 It is unnecessary here to evaluate whether
eliminating the warrant requirement would be normatively desirable.206 Suffice it
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 769, 811
(1994). ). David Gray makes a similar argument in DAVID GRAY, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE (2017).
203 This may be because the scope of “search” is not the focus of his Fourth Amendment
interpretation; the main thrust of his argument is that the Fourth Amendment does not
require or favor the use of warrants, but only mandates that searches be generally
reasonable. Id. at 759. Amar also concedes that his definition of search would give the
Fourth Amendment enormous scope, subjecting huge quantities of government action to
potential judicial scrutiny and swallowing up the entirety of substantive due process law
and parts of equal protection. Id. at 811.
204 Id. at 801 (proposing a substantive test for reasonableness based on what “[c]ommon
sense tells us.”) Amar also notes that, because the Justices have generally required a
warrant and/or probable cause for most Fourth Amendment searches, they “have spent
surprisingly little time self-consciously reflecting on what, exactly, makes for a
substantively unreasonable search or seizure.” Id.
205 See id. at 761 (proposing eliminating the warrant requirement).
206 Unlike the Katz test for Fourth Amendment scope, the warrant requirement has not
come under widespread scholarly attack. Instead, many scholars have lamented its
erosion by exceptions and “special needs” cases. See, e.g., Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth
Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the Warrant Requirement Through Strict
Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531 (1997); Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs
Rationale: Creating a Chasm in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89
(1992); Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth
Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1991). There is also a robust debate over whether the
Fourth Amendment’s ambiguous history supports or undermines the warrant
requirement. Compare Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1181 (2016) (“reasonable” searches and seizures usually require warrants because
warrantless searches and seizures would have typically violated the common law); Davies, supra
note 66, at 738 (a warrant requirement more closely approximates the unrecoverable
original intent); WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL
MEANING, 602–1791, lxvi (2009) (“[S]pecific warrants were mandatory and were intended
to be the conventional method of search and seizure.”), with Amar, supra note 202, at 761–
202
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to say that the rule has been at the heart of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence since
its inception,207 and so long as it exists, an extremely broad reading of “search” is
unworkable. The scope of the “search” concept remains a mystery, especially in
the context of a body of law that favors warrants and suspicion before the police
can search.
b. “Persons, Houses, Papers, and Effects”
The Fourth Amendment protects people’s right to be secure in their “persons,
houses, papers, and effects.” These categories are fairly capacious, but can be read
as providing at least some textual limits on the scope of the Fourth Amendment.
Things not listed in this clause may be ineligible for Fourth Amendment
protection, in accord with the traditional canon of construction expressio unius.208
This was the Supreme Court’s interpretation in 1928’s Olmstead v. United
States, where the Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to
conversations because they were not material things like “papers” or “effects.”209
Yet the Court overruled Olmstead in 1967, ruling that the Fourth Amendment
could apply to intangible things.210 The Olmstead approach has virtually no
defenders today, even among originalists.211 Instead, the clause is generally
interpreted to be illustrative, providing examples of things that are protected by

71 (history indicates no warrant requirement); TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 46–47 (1969) (same).
207 See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393.
208 “Expressio unius est esclusio alterius,” i.e., “the express mention of one thing excludes
all others,” generally means that a list of items excludes similar items not listed.
209 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
210 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). The Court has likewise extended the
Amendment’s reach to commercial property, despite its absence from the list. Marshall v.
Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311–12 (1978). However, the rule that physical intrusion on
“open fields” is not a Fourth Amendment search remains good law. Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 183–84 (1984).
211 Originalists who have weighed in on the matter have generally endorsed Katz’s
extension of Fourth Amendment protection to intangible things like telephone
conversations. See Amar, supra note 202, at 781; Robert Bork, The Constitution, Original
Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 826 (1986); RAOUL BERGER, DEATH
PENALTIES 73 (1982); see also Laurent Sacharoff, Constitutional Trespass, 81 TENN. L. REV.
877, 882 (2014) (acknowledging that the Fourth Amendment must cover intangible things
as well as physical trespasses in order to serve core Fourth Amendment values), but cf.
David E. Steinberg, The Original Understanding of Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 56
FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2004) (arguing on historical grounds that the Fourth Amendment
prohibits only physical searches of houses).
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the Fourth Amendment rather than strictly limiting its coverage.212
Moreover, even if the Olmstead interpretation were adopted, the Fourth
Amendment’s text would still offer no formal guidance to courts in a huge portion
of cases. There are myriad difficult questions of scope involving persons (facial
recognition programs, CCTV or satellite monitoring), houses (infrared scanners,213
drug-sniffing dogs,214 drone and airplane surveillance215), “papers” (emails,216 text
messages,217 instant messages), and effects (cell phone tracking,218 automobile GPS
tracking,219 license plate monitoring). Courts will find no answers to these
questions in the Fourth Amendment’s text.

2. History and Purpose
There is very little direct historical evidence relating to the Fourth
Amendment’s scope.220
Indeed, the Founding-era history of the Fourth
Amendment as a whole is sparse and ambiguous.221 Although conjectures can be
made about its general historical meaning, there is virtually no clear guidance for
courts trying to determine when the Fourth Amendment applies.
Indeed, there are remarkably few Founding-era statements on the Fourth
Amendment by framers or legislators, and virtually none concerning the
Amendment’s scope. There was no discussion of a search and seizure provision

See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 211, at 73 (“‘Of course the fourth amendment…goes
beyond physical searches to comprehend wiretaps and electronic surveillance. They are
analogous to what was prohibited and illustrate the application of principle to similar
facts.”). One reason the Olmstead interpretation has few defenders may be that its
consequences for privacy and the rule of law were disastrous. See Matthew Tokson,
Automation and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 583 (2011).
213 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
214 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
215 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
216 Warshak v. United States, 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010) (Warshak III).
217 City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
218 In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612 (5th Cir. 2013).
219 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
220 See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 65, at 70–72.
221 See Clancy, supra note 136, at 983 (finding that “there is no consensus regarding the
details or meaning of the historical record”); Davies, supra note 66, at, 551 (“the
participants in the historical controversies that stimulated the framing of the Fourth
Amendment simply did not discuss when a warrant was required.”); Wasserstrom &
Seidman, supra note 66, at 78 (“[A]t least in the fourth amendment context, the words,
structure, and history do not yield a determinate outcome.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); TAYLOR, supra note 206, at 43 (“Nothing in the legislative or other history of the
fourth amendment sheds much light on the purpose of [its] first clause.”).
212
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at the Constitutional Convention.222 The subsequent debate over a potential bill of
rights “rarely involved delving into the details of an enumeration of a bill of
rights” but focused instead on the general need for rights protections.223 The few,
isolated references to protection against searches and seizures were “themselves
vague assertions, consisting of little more than a phrase or a sentence or two.”224
These generally raised concerns about the use of general warrants, the potentially
unlimited powers of government officials, and the protection of the home.225
James Madison initially drafted the Fourth Amendment, which resembled in
structure Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, itself drafted by
John Adams.226 Madison gave no explanation of the Amendment beyond an intent
to deter general warrants,227 and there is no record of any comment by Adams on
the Massachusetts search and seizure provision.228 The Fourth Amendment
generated virtually no recorded debate in Congress.229 State records regarding the
ratification of the Amendment reveal that “[n]one of [the state legislative] journals
preserves a single utterance by a state legislator on the right respecting search and
seizure.”230 The silence is daunting.
Likewise, the broader Founding-era history surrounding the Fourth
Amendment provides virtually no useful guidance to courts deciding cases
involving the Fourth Amendment’s scope. The most influential part of that history
involves a series of abuses by King George III and his officers that raised concerns
in the Colonies about unreasonable searches and seizures.231 In Wilkes v. Wood and
Entick v. Carrington, for example, English officers empowered by general warrants
entered and searched the homes of citizens suspected of libel against the King.232
The homeowners sued for trespass and won substantial damage awards. 233
Clancy, supra note 136, at 1029.
Id. at 1032.
224 Id. Clancy also notes that “There are no tracts or detailed discussions about a search
and seizure provision.” Id. at 1033–34.
225 Id. at 1033.
226 Id. at 1027, 1044.
227 Id. at 1045–46
228 Id. at 1028
229 Id. at 1047, 1051.
230 CUDDIHY, supra note 206, at 713. (“To the extent that the direct evidence indicates, the
amendment’s ratifiers took their thoughts about its original meaning to the grave.”).
231 Kerr, supra note 65, at 70.
232 Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 499 (C.P. 1763); Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell’s State
Trials 1029 (C.P. 1765).
233 Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498 (jury awarded 1,000 pounds in damages); Entick, 19
Howell’s State Trials at 1036 (jury awarded 300 pounds in damages); see generally Amar,
supra note 202, at 798, 814 (discussing punitive damages in early trespass cases).
222
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These cases suggest that a government official entering one’s home, looking
around inside, and going through one’s belongings was the paradigmatic Fourth
Amendment search.234 This comports with the text and drafting history of the
Amendment, both of which reflect a concern with general warrants and the
inspection of private homes.235
Today, the idea that the physical inspection of a house by government officials
is a search is uncontroversial. It is the clearest possible example of a search, one
end of a vast spectrum ranging from obvious searches to obvious non-searches. It
provides little guidance to a court trying to determine whether some other type of
government activity is a search. As Orin Kerr has noted, “Examples alone cannot
identify how far beyond their facts the principle should extend.”236
Nor is there doctrinal or historical support for limiting the Fourth
Amendment’s scope to trespasses only. Indeed, it appears that no jurist or scholar
advocates such an approach.237 To be sure, the pre-Founding cases involved real
property trespass actions, and most Founding-era searches would have required
physical intrusion, because most nonphysical means of surveillance had not yet
been invented.238 But there is no evidence that the Framers intended to limit the
concept of searches to only those contexts that commonly arose in 1791, or that the
contemporary remedy of trespass liability was meant to somehow limit the extent
of “searches.”239 And there is little basis for arguing that “searches” should be read
to include only the specific searches that existed at the time of ratification. The
Supreme Court emphatically rejected a similar argument regarding “arms” in the

Kerr, supra note 65, at 72.
Incidentally, there is no clear founding-era evidence that physical inspections of
vehicles or chattels outside the home were Fourth Amendment searches, and the first
Congress authorized suspicionless inspections of certain vehicles and non-residential
buildings. See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal, An Empirical Inquiry into the Use of Originalism in
Constitutional Adjudication (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author, p. 42).
236 Kerr, supra note 65, at 73.
237 Cf. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (employing a trespass-like concept
but noting that Katz would continue to govern non-physical searches involving electronic
signals); Sacharoff, supra note 211, at 882 (proposing a trespass-based approach to the
Fourth Amendment’s scope in addition to a separate privacy-based test); Amar, supra
note 202, at 769, 781, 811 (advocating a trespass-like remedy for Fourth Amendment
violations but also a broad interpretation of search that covers intangible as well as
tangible things).
238 Also, subpoenas for documents in criminal proceedings were unheard of in the prefounding era, and were generally rejected in civil proceedings as well. See Entick, v.
Carrington, (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials (C.B.) at 1073 (“There is no process against
papers in civil causes ….[though] [i]t has often been tried….In the criminal law such a
proceeding was never heard of.”).
239 Kerr, supra note 65, at 74–76; Sacharoff, supra note 211, at 898.
234
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Second Amendment:
Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that
only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by
the Second Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional rights
that way. Just as the First Amendment protects modern forms of
communications, and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern
forms of search, the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all
instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not
in existence at the time of the founding.240
As the Court itself notes, the same can be said of searches that did not exist at the
founding.
None of this is to say that trespass concepts should never be a part of Fourth
Amendment law,241 or that history cannot serve as an inspiration for new
proposals in this area.242 The point is simply that history itself gives us little
concrete guidance in determining what exactly is and is not a Fourth Amendment
search. It can inspire us, but it does not compel us.
Thus, beyond the uncontroversial principles that the physical inspection of a
house is a search and that general warrants are unlawful, the lessons of history
tend to be very broad and abstract.243 The bedrock purpose of the Fourth
Amendment was to protect privacy, property, and liberty from undue intrusions
by government officers.244 This purpose is reflected in the Framers’ rejection of
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008).
Laurent Sacharoff has argued that trespass concepts should be incorporated into
existing Fourth Amendment scope law. Laurent Sacharoff, Constitutional Trespass, 81
TENN. L. REV. 877, 882–83 (2014).
242 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 202, at 814–16 (advocating various new institutions for
regulating law enforcement, inspired by his historical analysis, including a “Fourth
Amendment Fund” to educate Americans about the Amendment, attorney’s fees awards
for successful plaintiffs, and citizen review panels overseen by administrative agencies).
243 See Morgan Cloud, Searching through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
1707, 1746 (1996).
244 Id. at 1726 (“[T]he historical record suggests that objections to general warrants and
general searches alike rested upon broad concerns about protecting privacy, property,
and liberty from unwarranted and unlimited intrusions.”); C UDDIHY, supra note 206, at
766 (“Privacy was the bedrock concern of the amendment, not general warrants.”);
Davies, supra note 66, at 744–45 (“it is certainly the case that the Framers intended to
preserve a personal and domestic sphere that would be meaningfully protected against
undue intrusions by government officers”); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)
(“It is not the breaking of [a man’s] doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”).
240
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general and invalid warrants, which were the primary means of authorizing
intrusions in an era before professionalized police forces or laws against resisting
law enforcement officers.245 But how this general purpose should manifest in
individual cases remains unclear.

3. Past and Present Fourth Amendment Tests
In the early days of the republic, the Fourth Amendment rarely came up in
reported cases.246 Early Fourth Amendment “search” cases generally invoked
either property,247 or privacy,248 or both.249 There was not yet any conflict between
these two concepts. That changed in Olmstead, where the Court held that the
government could record conversations so long as they did not physically intrude
on constitutionally protected forms of property.250
The consequences of Olmstead were ruinous for privacy and citizen security,
as the government used its largely unfettered wiretapping power to monitor a vast
array of private conversations and to threaten disfavored political groups and civil
rights leaders.251 Eventually, the failures of Olmstead’s property-focused approach
led to the replacement of the property regime with a new Fourth Amendment
test.252 Under this “Katz test,” if the government violates people’s “reasonable
expectations of privacy”253—defined in various cases by reference to concepts like

Davies, supra note 66, at 552, 554, 620, 623–27 (discussing how controlling warrants
was an effective means of controlling Founding-era law-enforcement officers and
describing how the context and practice of law enforcement has radically changed since
the Founding).
246 Id. at 613. The Fourth Amendment did not apply to the states until 1949. Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28–29 (1949).
247 See United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (finding no search of a boat because the
Coast Guard observed its decks visually from a distance and did not physically explore
the boat).
248 See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (“The Fourth Amendment forbids
every search that is unreasonable and is construed liberally to safeguard the right of
privacy.”)
249 See Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 13 (1918) (discussing Fourth and Fifth
Amendment principles and noting that all of them involved “force or threats or trespass
upon property [or] some invasion of privacy.”); Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (discussing
intrusions on both property and the “privacies of life”).
250 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457, 464 (1928).
251 See, e.g., Tokson, supra note 212, at 583.
252 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
253 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
245
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probability,254 social norms,255 existing law,256 or normative considerations257—
then it has committed a search.258 The Katz test is a proxy test—courts applying it
use citizens’ expectations of privacy as a proxy for the underlying balance between
the competing values of privacy and the effectiveness of law enforcement.
Katz has been the dominant test ever since, although it was recently
supplemented by the Court in a pair of cases involving tangible property. These
cases added a “physical touching” test, under which certain types of physical
intrusion onto property are also Fourth Amendment “searches” even if they
would not otherwise be searches under the Katz test.259 In these cases, the physical
touching without permission of a citizen’s property, no matter how minimal, is
used as a proxy standard that determines the Fourth Amendment’s scope.
Thus the Supreme Court’s approach to the blank slate of Fourth Amendment
scope has been to adopt various proxy tests—first physical trespasses on property,
then reasonable expectations of privacy, and now a test that encompasses both
reasonable expectations and physical touching for information-gathering
purposes.
It is debatable whether a proxy approach was the optimal strategy for
developing a Fourth Amendment test, given the complexity of the issues
surrounding government surveillance and personal privacy and the tendency of
new technologies to destabilize Fourth Amendment law. Certainly, the Katz test
has been emphatically and almost universally criticized.260 It is incoherent,261

Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000).
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 113–14 (2006).
256 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989).
257 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984).
258 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178; see generally Kerr, supra note 3, at 507–22.
259 Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–17 (2013).
260 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 384 (1974); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1468, 1468 (1985); Morgan Cloud, Rube Goldberg Meets the Constitution: The Supreme
Court, Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 72 Miss. L.J. 5, 28-29 (2002); Sherry F. Colb,
What Is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a
Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119, 121 (2002); Donald R.C. Pongrace, Stereotypification of the
Fourth Amendment’s Public/Private Distinction: An Opportunity for Clarity, 34 AM. U. L.
REV. 1191, 1208 (1985); Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 103
(2008); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between
Government and Citizen?, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1751, 1771 (1994); Wasserstrom & Seidman,
supra note 66, at 28–29.
261 Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511 (2010);
Etzioni, supra note 260, at 420–21.
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unpredictable,262 tautological,263 and unhelpful in practice,264 among numerous
other flaws.265 The recent, property-based sub-test is unlikely to substantially
improve the Katz regime. It mirrors pre-Katz precedents that were widely viewed
as pernicious or arbitrary266 and were largely repudiated in Katz itself.267 The subtest has also proven to be vague, confusing, and capable of generating significant
line-drawing problems.268 The repeated failures of various proxy standards to
provide a coherent and effective test reflect the difficulty of fashioning a proxy that
can effectively capture the complex balance that underlies the concept of Fourth
Amendment search.
Section III.A below further explores the potential
implications of blank slate theory for Fourth Amendment law.

D. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment
Blank slates may arise when courts are called upon to define an important
term or phrase used in a previous decision. In Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
the Supreme Court ruled that sexual harassment constituted “discriminat[ion] …
because of such individual’s … sex” under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.269 Further,
the Court held that sexual harassment encompassed not only harassment linked
to an economic quid pro quo but also harassment creating a hostile work
environment.270 But the Court did not explain how lower courts should determine
what makes a work environment hostile.271 Nor is the concept self-defining or
obvious, except in the more extreme cases of workplace harassment.272
Courts applying Meritor thus lacked a test to guide them in assessing a
Bradley, supra note 260, at 1470; Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth
Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1149 (1998).
263 Baude & Stern, supra note 92, at 1824–25.
264 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); see Daniel J. Solove,
Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1511, 1522–24 (2010).
265
E.g., Amitai Etzioni, Eight Nails into Katz’s Coffin, 65 Case W. L. Rev. 413 (2014)
(discussing additional flaws in the Katz regime.)
266
See, e.g., EAVESDROPPING ORDERS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 355,
357–59 (1966) (citing several such critiques).
267
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53; id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
268 George M. Dery III, Failing to Keep "Easy Cases Easy": Florida v. Jardines Refuses to
Reconcile Inconsistencies in Fourth Amendment Privacy Law by Instead Focusing on Physical
Trespass, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 471–79 (2014).
269 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
270 Id. at 66.
271 A similar phrase also appeared in non-binding EEOC guidelines on sexual
harassment, but the guidelines did not define the phrase. 45 Fed. Reg. 74677.
272 See id. at 60, 67 (noting that plaintiff’s allegations of pervasive harassment and forcible
rape were plainly sufficient for a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment.)
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potentially hostile work environment. Nor was there any statutory text
addressing the concept of a hostile environment or anything helpful in the meager
legislative history on sex-based discrimination.273 In the subsequent case Harris v.
Forklift Systems, Inc., the Court created such a test, writing on an essentially blank
slate.274 Harris established a broad proxy standard, one that looks to all relevant
circumstances and specifies several important but non-exhaustive factors,
including: “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether
it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”275 The Court
also required that the employee subjectively perceive the environment as
abusive.276 It rejected a stricter standard that would have required a showing of a
serious impact on an employee’s psychological well-being.277
The Court could have used a direct balancing approach, weighing the various
harms to the employee against the potential chilling of non-harassing speech or
excessive liability for minor incidents of rudeness. But the blank slate here was
fairly narrow, fact-based, and not especially complex.278 A proxy test is likely to
be effective in this context. Indeed, a simpler proxy standard might have been
equally effective and easier to apply than the capacious, multi-factor standard the
Court chose.279

The prohibition against sex discrimination was added to the statute “at the last
minute” and generated relatively little debate. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63–64.
As a result, there is “little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the Act’s
prohibition against discrimination based on ‘sex.’” Id. at 64.
274 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993). Some analogies might be
drawn to hostile environment cases involving race-based discrimination, but those cases
had not produced a test prior to Harris. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (discussing racial
discrimination cases involving non-economic, hostile environment harassment); Harris,
510 U.S. at 21–22 (discussing hostile work environment cases).
275 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
276 Id. at 21.
277 Id.
278 Further, the underlying normative considerations likely tilted in favor of a
harassment-free workplace, and a lopsided normative balance can contribute to
simplicity.
279 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (advocating for a standard that
focuses on “whether the discriminatory conduct has unreasonably interfered with the
plaintiff's work performance” and explaining that “[t]o show such interference, the
plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has declined as a result of
the harassment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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E. Detention During a Police Search
Courts addressing blank slates may choose to adopt proxy rules instead of
proxy standards. The choice between rules and standards is a complex one with
its own rich scholarly literature.280 In this context, suffice it to say that proxy rules
are likely to be most effective for relatively narrow blank slates, especially when
normative considerations tend to strongly favor one outcome.281 In such
situations, a rule will frequently yield the correct outcome while lowering decision
costs, meaning that both error costs and decision costs will be low.
The law of detention during search provides an example of a court using a
proxy rule to stand in for a fairly one-sided normative balance. In the 1981 case
Michigan v. Summers, the Supreme Court had to decide when, if ever, the police
may detain the occupant of a home while they carry out a valid search warrant. 282
Although text and history usually provide some guidance for courts assessing
Fourth Amendment seizures, the issue of detention during a home search was
unique because it fell into a conceptual gap created by modern Supreme Court
precedents.
Before the 1960s, numerous precedents had established that seizures required
probable cause, a requirement that “was treated as absolute.”283 But in Terry v.
Ohio, the Court held that police officers could perform some limited seizures with
less than probable cause, so long as they met the standard of reasonable
suspicion.284 In several other cases, the Court evaluated certain searches and
seizures with a reasonableness balancing inquiry, often allowing the police to
search or seize with no suspicion at all.285 It was indeterminate which line of
precedents courts should apply to the unique question of when the police may
detain a house’s occupant while carrying out a valid search warrant. Nor was
there any direct formal guidance as to whether the existence of a search warrant
could help to justify a seizure.286
The Court in Michigan v. Summers recognized the normative balance
underlying the question of detention during a house search. Indeed, it overtly

See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
282 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
283 Dunaway v. N.Y., 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).
284 392 U.S. 1, 21–22.
285 See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543 (1976).
286 See Summers, 452 U.S. at 701–05 (1981) (discussing the search warrant’s relevance for
related seizures).
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weighed the competing considerations.287 On one side was a significant intrusion
on the liberty of the persons detained, although the Court found that this was less
intrusive than the search itself, and did not carry the stigma of an arrest on public
streets.288 Further, the risk of abuse was mitigated because any such detention
would only occur incident to the execution of a search warrant approved by a
neutral magistrate.289 On the other side of the balance were several benefits:
preventing the occupant from fleeing if incriminating evidence was found,
minimizing the risk of harm to officers, and potentially avoiding property damage
by securing the help of the occupant in opening locked doors or containers.290 The
balance of interests tilted in favor of the government, and the Court accordingly
created a categorical rule that “a warrant to search for contraband … implicitly
carries with it the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises.” 291
The Court thus adopted a proxy rule to stand in for the normative balance
underlying the question of detention incident to a search warrant. It expressly
declined to establish a balancing test.292 It also rejected several competing proxy
standards. The dissent suggested that a seizure incident to a search warrant would
only be justified if the police had specific and articulable facts demonstrating a
reasonable risk of physical harm.293 The United States filed an amicus brief
arguing that the appropriate standard should ultimately be a reasonable suspicion
of unlawful activity.294 The Court declined to adopt these, preferring a more
workable, bright-line rule that did not require officers to evaluate the quantum of
suspicion.295
A proxy value is likely to be effective in this context. Indeed, the Michigan v.
Summers rule persists today, generating no especial controversy and recently
reaffirmed by the Court.296 The legal question of Summers was narrow, involving

Id.
Id. at 701–02.
289 Id. at 703–04.
290 Id. at 702–03.
291 Id. at 705.
292 Id. at 705 n.19 (“[I]f police are to have workable rules, the balancing of the competing
interests … must in large part be done on a categorical basis—not in an ad hoc, case-bycase fashion by individual police officers. The rule we adopt today does not depend upon
such an ad hoc determination.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
293 Id. at 709 n.1 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
294 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Michigan v. Summers, Case No. 79-1794,
1980 WL 339690 (December 5, 1980), at *20–22.
295 Summers, 452 U.S. at 705 n.19.
296 See Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013) (determining the geographical extent of
the well-established Summers rule). The Court’s later extensions of the Summers rule
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a fairly straightforward normative balance that favored one side. There were
several proxies that might have effectively reflected this balance. The Court
plausibly concluded that a categorical rule would produce better outcomes over
time than the standards favored by the federal government or the dissenting
justices.
This section has examined how courts have addressed a variety of blank slate
situations. It has drawn lessons from these examples and demonstrated how blank
slate theory can help explain the outcomes and doctrines of these important cases.
The next Part applies these lessons to broader debates about legal interpretation,
as well as the specific context of the Fourth Amendment.

III. IMPLICATIONS OF BLANK SLATE THEORY
This Part examines some of the implications of blank slate theory. It starts by
examining how the theory can be used to help courts create effective legal tests in
areas where existing tests are working poorly. It then discusses how blank slate
theory can inform broader debates about legal interpretation, and how it can
augment both formalist and non-formalist interpretive theories. The last section
examines the temporal element of legal development, exploring how the
decisionmaking regimes discussed in Part II are likely to change over time and
describing how blank slate theory can contribute to the growing literature on
rulification and legal change.

A. Evaluating and Replacing Existing Legal Tests
Blank slate theory can help courts confronting newly arising blank slates, in
cases of first impression and other contexts.297 It is also helpful in analyzing
existing tests and proposing new tests. In situations where formal sources of law
are largely silent, precedents may eventually accrue, filling in the blank slate and
providing a foundation of formal law to guide future courts. But courts are not
infallible and addressing blank slates can be difficult. Often, the tests created by
precedent will be substantially flawed or at least subject to serious critique on
various grounds.
have been criticized. See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Redefining Reasonable Seizures, 93 Denver L.
Rev. 53, 76, 101 (2015).
297
For example, the Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. confronted a new blank slate when it
was asked to define an important concept established in a previous case but left undefined. See
supra Part II.D; see generally supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the various ways that blank slates can
arise).
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The analysis developed above can be used to evaluate courts’ existing
approaches to particular blank slates. And it can bolster—or undermine—
proposals in favor of new legal tests. Accordingly, if current law employs a
balancing test where a proxy is likely to be more effective, or vice versa, that may
be a powerful argument in favor of doctrinal change.
This Section uses the example of the Fourth Amendment’s scope, where
existing tests have been severely criticized, to show how blank slate theory can
provide theoretical support for a substantial legal change. The theory can help
improve Fourth Amendment law, pointing the way toward an optimal regime for
determining scope and helping to explain why previous approaches like the Katz
test have been so unsuccessful. A similar exercise might be performed with any
of the blank slates identified above or any other blank slates that arise as courts
confront new legal questions for which existing formal sources give minimal
guidance.

1. Choosing a Legal Regime for Fourth Amendment Search
Imagine that we are considering replacing the current Katz-led regime for
determining the scope of the Fourth Amendment. (Perhaps we are convinced by
the legion of Katz critics and the numerous flaws they have identified in the current
regime.298) We look to formal sources of law like text, history, and purpose, but
they are essentially silent on the relevant questions.299 Blank slate theory can help
determine the optimal approach to formulating a new test. Generally speaking,
courts might choose either a direct balancing or proxy value test, and blank slate
theory can assist courts in systematically evaluating this choice.
The first step would be to assess the likelihood that a proxy value could
capture the general normative balance of Fourth Amendment search. This balance
has been identified, at least in broad terms, in the Fourth Amendment caselaw and
literature: it is the balance between the benefits of improved law enforcement on
the one hand and the harms to civilian privacy and security on the other.300
Although this abstract balance is easy to identify, each side of it raises complex
issues that may be difficult to capture with a simple proxy value. The benefits to
298

See supra notes 260–268 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.C.
300 See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1984); Orin S. Kerr, An EquilibriumAdjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 526 (2011);
Amsterdam, supra note 260, at 403.
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law enforcement of a certain type of surveillance will often be context-dependent,
may vary based on the availability of alternative methods, and are inherently
probabilistic—many searches will not yield any evidence or law enforcement
benefit. Many of the benefits of crime detection are themselves complicated, such
as deterrent effect and the net benefit to society of incapacitating the guilty via
imprisonment.301 On the other side, harms to privacy from government activity
are multifaceted and often poorly understood.302
Moreover, the technological and social context of government surveillance is
particularly unstable. Technological advances like the telephone, recording
devices, and the internet have repeatedly destabilized surveillance law and policy
by making possible new types of government searches and creating new threats
to personal privacy. Emerging technologies and changes to social practices and
norms will likely cause similar disruptions in the future.
Finally, Fourth Amendment search is a broad legal concept covering a wide
variety of government and private activities. Government surveillance activities
alone can range from asking questions of a person on the street, to subpoenaing a
suspect’s bank records, to using spy satellites to constantly monitor large numbers
of people.
All of these considerations suggest that it will be difficult to ever find an
effective proxy test for the Fourth Amendment’s scope. Because the normative
calculus underlying Fourth Amendment search is complex, any proxy value is
likely to leave out important normative considerations. The relative instability of
the government surveillance context is likely to undermine any proxy test. And it
will be difficult to forge a proxy regime to effectively address the broad variety of
questions that arise under the concept of Fourth Amendment search.
We would also want to consider how much easier a Fourth Amendment proxy
test would be to administer than a direct balancing approach. This will vary
depending on the proxy being considered. For example, several scholars have
proposed a positive law regime as a proxy approach for Fourth Amendment
search.303 Under a positive law regime, a government action is a Fourth
Amendment search if the action is a tort or violates a law.304 Such a regime would
likely be easier to administer than a direct balancing approach, because in many
See generally Orin S. Kerr, An Economic Understanding of Search and Seizure Law, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. 591, 599 & n.37 (2016).
302 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 478–82 (2006)
(describing the complexity and the multivalent nature of the legal concept of privacy).
303 See Baude & Stern, supra note 92, at 1837–50; Michael Mannheimer, The Contingent
Fourth Amendment, 64 EMORY L.J. 1229, 1284–87 (2015).
304 See Tokson, supra note 119, at 191.
301
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cases government actions will clearly be either lawful (operating a helicopter
above the legal minimum height) or unlawful (going through a person’s trash in
violation of a local ordinance). But a positive law approach will not be easy to
apply in all cases, because it will frequently be indeterminate. Privacy torts and
trespass laws often turn on standards like “reasonableness” that are no more
concrete than the vague standards of Fourth Amendment law.305 And private
parties rarely litigate many types of issues that arise in surveillance cases, such as
drug-sniffing dogs or CCTV cameras.306 The administrability benefits of a positive
law regime are real, but not nearly as substantial as they initially appear.
Finally, we should consider how likely courts are to be able to obtain the
information necessary for normative balancing in the Fourth Amendment context.
It may be difficult to find useful information on harms to citizens’ privacy, as these
harms are hard to quantify and there are relatively few studies on the concrete
psychological and social harms of privacy invasions. The government is
reasonably well situated to offer useful information about the benefits of a
particular search technique to law enforcement, but, in frontier cases, such
information will often be conjectural or reflect only limited police use of such a
technique.
However, useful information on privacy harms and law enforcement activity
has become increasingly available in recent years. Legal scholars have begun the
difficult work of quantifying privacy harms, and some relevant psychological
studies have been conducted.307 Courts can increasingly gather, in their own
digital records and databases, systemic facts about police behavior. 308 Moreover,
some harms related to police searches are easier to quantify than privacy harms,
such as the harms caused by police coercion, harassment, or the threat of force.309
The information relevant to a direct normative balancing test would be somewhat
difficult for courts to obtain, but the difficulty is gradually diminishing and there
are already several sources of useful information available to courts.

See Re, supra note 111, at 320.
Id.
307 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data
Breach Harms, 96 Texas L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data
Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 335 tbl. (2008); Carl Botan,
Communication Work and Electronic Surveillance: A Model for Predicting Panoptic Effects,
63 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 293, 307, 307–10 (1996); John R. Aiello & Kathryn J. Colb, Electronic
Performance Monitoring and Social Context: Impact on Productivity and Stress, 80 J. APPLIED
PSYCH. 339 (1995).
308 See Crespo, supra note 117, at 2070–86.
309 Stuntz, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1065–66.
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Overall, the considerations discussed in this section suggest that a direct
normative balancing test would be the optimal approach to the blank slate of
Fourth Amendment search. Every factor suggests a low likelihood that a proxy
value will ever be able to capture the Fourth Amendment’s normative balance.
And a proxy that does not encompass fundamental normative values—a “leaky”
proxy—is likely to generate large error costs that dwarf any administrability
benefits. For instance, a leaky proxy is likely to decide important cases based on
almost wholly irrelevant considerations.310
In addition, the administrability benefits of the best-known proxy alternative
(a positive law regime) are likely not substantial enough to risk the use of a leaky
proxy.311 The difficulty of obtaining information relevant to normative balancing
does weigh slightly in favor of a proxy alternative. But this is typically the least
determinative factor, and relevant information is not so scarce as to present a major
obstacle to normative balancing.
Ultimately, Fourth Amendment scope is analogous to issues like the scope of
the dormant Commerce Clause or the First Amendment’s treatment of contentneutral speech regulations. Like the First Amendment, it presents a complex
normative balance and covers a broad range of situations. Like the dormant
Commerce Clause, the Fourth Amendment has been subject to several proxy rules
that have failed because they have been too leaky or too incoherent. As in those
contexts, balancing is likely to be the best strategy for addressing the Fourth
Amendment’s blank slate.
This is not to say that the test for Fourth Amendment scope should certainly
be a balancing test. Some scholar or court may yet devise a proxy that captures
the normative balance underlying the Fourth Amendment but nonetheless
remains simple and administrable. Nor is this Article elaborating a specific test or
defending such a test against myriad potential objections—that would require
another article. Its claim is only that, until an effective proxy emerges, blank slate
theory suggests that some form of balancing is likely to be the optimal strategy.
Moreover, blank slate theory can help us understand and articulate why the Katz
standard has failed as a test for the Fourth Amendment’s scope.

For a discussion of this problem in current Fourth Amendment law see supra note
Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text.
311 See Tokson, supra note 119, at 194 (describing how a positive law regime would
frequently lead courts to decide Fourth Amendment cases based on considerations
irrelevant to Fourth Amendment values).
310
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2. Understanding the Failures of the Katz Test
Scholars have extensively documented the flaws in the Katz test and its
failures to protect privacy in a variety of situations.312 Blank slate theory can give
us a broader understanding of precisely why Katz has done so poorly.
The Katz test has performed badly in part because people’s expectations of
privacy are a leaky proxy for the fundamental values underlying Fourth
Amendment scope. This is reflected in the small but significant number of cases
following Katz that explicitly or implicitly reject expectations of privacy as a basis
for the Fourth Amendment’s scope. In Smith v. Maryland, for example, the Court
explained that in certain situations, the Fourth Amendment will apply even when
people lack any expectation of privacy.313 Indeed, Smith overtly acknowledged
that the Katz standard leaves out vital normative considerations of freedom and
privacy.314 There are also several cases where the Fourth Amendment does not
apply even when people in general do expect privacy.315 For instance, despite the
fact that people in general expect that their personal conversations will go
unrecorded, it is not a search when an undercover officer records such
conversations.316 Again, Katz’s focus on “actual expectations of privacy” leaves
out important normative considerations.317
The failure of the Katz test to capture fundamental normative interests is
problematic for several reasons. First, despite the cases just described, courts
frequently have applied the flawed Katz standard and looked to people’s
expectations of privacy when determining the Fourth Amendment’s scope. 318
Lower courts are especially likely to apply the Katz test literally in cases of first
impression, often reaching normatively questionable results based on their
assessments of privacy expectations.319 Second, the failure of the Katz test to
See supra notes [see part II.C.3]
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 n.5 (1979).
314 Id.; see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 n.7 (1984) (downplaying the role of
expectations in Fourth Amendment law and noting the flaws in an expectation-based
test).
315 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405
(2005).
316 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751–52 (1971) (noting that people do not expect
their conversations to be monitored by government agents and that conversation would
be impaired if they did).
317 Id. at 752.
318 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 215 (1986).
319 See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612 (5th Cir.
2013); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008).
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embody fundamental Fourth Amendment values has led courts to expand and
modify Katz haphazardly, creating several conflicting approaches to the Fourth
Amendment’s scope.320 The resulting mess of precedents and the need to choose
between multiple models of the Katz test has perplexed courts and scholars. This
confusion also makes the Katz test difficult and costly to administer in cases of first
impression—further reducing its value as a proxy test.
Thus, blank slate theory provides a useful perspective on the failures of the
Katz test. Katz’s “reasonable expectations of privacy” standard is a leaky proxy,
and it has become very difficult to properly apply. Moreover, its failure as a proxy
may have been inevitable from the start, given the complexity of the normative
balance underlying the Fourth Amendment’s scope. The core problem is not how
courts have interpreted or limited Katz in subsequent cases, but rather the flaws in
the very design of the Katz standard.

B. Lessons for Interpretive Debates
Blank slate theory can offer a fresh perspective on longstanding debates about
legal interpretation. Theories of legal interpretation are numerous and varied, and
disputes between competing theories make up a large proportion of our legal
discourse. Such theories might be categorized in a variety of ways.321 For present
purposes, I will group interpretive theories into three categories, intended to track
the major fault lines of interpretive disputes. First are formal theories of
interpretation, those that interpret law based solely on formal sources like text,
history, or precedent.322 Second are extra-formal theories, which posit that legal
sources should be interpreted based on both formal sources and external
considerations that are nonetheless a part of the legal enterprise.323 These external
considerations might include things like morality or the promotion of liberty. 324
Finally there are instrumental theories, which posit that interpretation should be
conducted by considering the consequences of alternative decisions and choosing
the best option (as determined by a particular theory like distributive justice,
communitarianism, or wealth maximization).325 Under these theories, formal
Kerr, supra note 3, at 507–22.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 24 (1990) (categorizing
legal theories generally as either “Legalistic” or “Skeptical”).
322 E.g., Baude & Sachs, supra note 17, at 1079; Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and
Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 61 (1994).
323 E.g., DWORKIN, supra note 32, at 138–43.
324 JAMES FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL READINGS AND
AGAINST ORIGINALISMS (2015); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 17–34 (2005).
325 E.g., POSNER, supra note 321, at 454–69; Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine
Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 580–91 (1986).
320
321

Forthcoming in Vol. 59, Boston College Law Review
sources are at most a source of institutional and rule-of-law benefits to be weighed
in the overall calculus.326
There are vigorous debates between adherents of extra-formal theories and
instrumental theories,327 and epic disputes between formal theorists and those of
the other two camps.328 Yet blank slates function largely outside of these debates,
because they exist only when formal sources offer no useful guidance or constraint
in interpretation. The unique lessons of blank slate theory can suggest
improvements and refinements to all three types of interpretive theory. For
instance, it can improve instrumental theories (or at least those that care about
maximizing utility) by giving them some specificity in terms of how to create
optimal legal tests. Blank slate theory goes beyond directing courts to seek the
holding that will produce the best outcome—it provides specific
recommendations for tests depending on the characteristics of the underlying
situation. Likewise, blank slate theory can improve extra-formal theories that
encompass policy considerations or normative justifications for law. For example,
blank slate theory may help judges determine which legal test would be the best
fit with the normative justifications that underlie a particular law.329
Many formalists have noted that legal gaps might, in theory, arise under
formal interpretive regimes.330 Blank slate theory can refine formal theories of
interpretation by identifying particular situations where substantial gaps have
arisen.331 And it can improve such theories by offering a normatively appealing
method for resolving such gaps in the absence of useful formal guidance.
Blank slate theory also has implications for situations where formal law does
provide some guidance. Many laws are only partially determinate, ruling out
many interpretations but still permitting a wide variety of potential approaches.332
In these cases, blank slate theory can help courts choose between competing
constructions of a law and create optimal decisionmaking regimes.
In situations where formal law is relatively clear, blank slate theory can help
POSNER, supra note 1, at 84.
Compare DWORKIN, supra note 32, at 119–45, with POSNER, supra note 321, at 197–203.
328 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989);
Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24, 2012),
https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textualoriginalism; FLEMING, supra note 324, at
329 See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text.
330 E.g., Baude & Sachs, supra note 17, at 1131, 1146–47; Solum, supra note 1, at 471;
Merrill, supra note 17, at 43.
331 See supra Part II.
332 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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evaluate existing legal tests. The theory can help instrumentalist decisionmakers
trade off the institutional and stability benefits of formal law against the costs of
applying inefficient tests. Even under more formal approaches, the theory can
help to determine when a statutory test is unworkable and should be amended or
repealed, or when courts should overturn or narrowly apply a precedent rather
than expanding its reach.333 The extreme case of blank slates focuses our attention
on proxy rules and how well they capture underlying normative values—but even
formally compelled rules can be evaluated based on similar criteria. Laws are
ultimately normative judgments made concrete, fashioned into rules by
legislatures, agencies, or higher courts. We can honor those judgments by
interpreting laws correctly. But we should not lose sight of the normative
decisions that underpin the laws, nor should we accept proxy rules or standards
uncritically even if courts are bound to apply them.
Thinking about law as a spectrum ranging from compelling commands all the
way to blank slates may actually bolster formal approaches to interpretation. The
tendency to treat all legal questions as determinable by formal sources can
ultimately undermine formalism. It can lead formalists to argue for certain
outcomes based on conjectural or flimsy formal evidence. (Examples might
include the use of far-fetched “textual hooks” to import various principles into the
Constitution334 or unwarranted certitude about obscure historical facts or
intentions.335) Incorporating blank slate theory and applying its lessons in cases
where formal sources provide only slight or ambiguous guidance can help prevent
formal theories from becoming outcome-driven and disingenuous in practice. A
less totalizing approach to formalism can preserve its role in the vast swath of
cases where formal sources really do have something to say.

See generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.
J. 921 (2016) (describing courts’ frequent practice of narrowing the scope of controlling
precedents).
334 See, e.g., Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (i) Cts Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1865, 1889 (1987) (criticizing, from a formalist perspective, the misguided use of textual
hooks to justify well-liked principles); Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88
MINN. L. REV. 384, 413 (2003) (critiquing the promiscuous use of textual hooks to support
principles that are actually structural).
335 One example of this is the Court’s claim in United States v. Jones that it had “no doubt”
that police officers’ tracking of a car via a GPS device “would have been considered a
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.” 565 U.S.
400, 404–05 (2012). Given that neither GPS satellites, nor cars, nor police departments,
nor a clear concept of “search” existed in 1791, the Court’s assertion is questionable and
its certitude is troubling. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 420 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
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C. Blank Slates, Timing, and Rulification
When a court creates a new legal test in response to a blank slate, that test is
not frozen forever in time—it continues to develop and change as courts apply it
in various situations. This section discusses how the modification of legal regimes
over time interacts with blank slate theory.
Rulification occurs when courts applying a standard promulgate sub-rules to
address particular situations.336 The overarching standard remains, but eventually
a large proportion of cases is governed by rules. Higher courts may sometimes
issue “rules against rulification,” instructing lower courts not to rulify a standard
when applying it to concrete cases.337 For example, in eBay v. MercExchange, the
Supreme Court struck down lower court decisions that had partially rulified the
traditional four-factor standard for issuing permanent injunctions.338 The Court
made it clear that, going forward, courts must apply the standard without any
shortcuts, engaging in detailed inquiries and tailoring outcomes to the specific
facts of each case.339
Rules against rulification are least desirable when further experimentation or
development in the lower courts is likely to be useful or informative.340 As lower
courts address new cases, they may make broad concepts more concrete, gather
additional relevant information, and develop particular sub-rules to improve a
doctrine and ease decision costs.341 Blank slates are, by their very nature, legal
questions on which there has been little ferment and where additional experience
and information is likely to be helpful. Rulification is thus, in general, likely to be
beneficial for both direct normative balancing tests and proxy standards in blank
slate contexts.342
Normative balancing tests are especially likely to benefit from rulification
over time. Balancing tests often have high decision costs that may be lowered by
rulification. They also direct courts to weigh the fundamental considerations
behind a legal question and give an honest, comprehensive account of the basis

See Frederick Schauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J.
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for their decisions.343 This is a complex task, but repeated consideration of a
normative question by different decisionmakers can yield useful insights. Courts
can also glean valuable information from repeated balancing whenever a balance
regularly favors one side over another in particular cases.344 In those contexts,
promulgating a rule to govern similar cases is likely to produce correct outcomes
while lowering decisions costs. Ultimately, this analysis suggests that the optimal
approach to many blank slates will be initial balancing that eventually hardens
into a set of tailored sub-rules to efficiently address particular situations.

CONCLUSION
Any constitutional, statutory, or common-law regime will leave gaps that
judges must fill in the course of resolving disputes. Legal blank slates arise when
these gaps are too substantial to be resolved with narrow decisions and require a
more systematic, forward-looking approach. A framework for thinking about
such gaps has been sorely lacking, in part because blank slates have not previously
been studied on their own.
This Article has identified the phenomenon of blank slates and provided a
methodology for addressing them. Its ultimate goal is to help courts avoid the
historical mistakes of dormant Commerce Clause or Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, where courts struggled for decades or centuries to fashion effective
legal standards. Indeed, on the complex issue of Fourth Amendment scope, courts
are still struggling. The Article has studied this important blank slate in detail and
offered a new theoretical framework for the concept of Fourth Amendment search.
Yet blank slates like those discussed above are likely to arise with increasing
frequency, as we move ever further away from the world in which the
Constitution was drafted. Moreover, in every area of law, societal and
technological change will continue to present novel legal questions not
contemplated by lawmakers or addressed by formal sources. The importance of a
systematic theory of blank slates is likely to grow even greater over time.
Finally, blank slate theory offers hope for advancing longstanding and
seemingly intractable debates about legal interpretation. It considers the
determinacy of law as a spectrum and uses the extreme case of blank slates to gain
new insights into legal interpretation generally. It can augment and refine a
variety of interpretive theories, lending specificity and substance to non-formal
theories and filling prescriptive gaps in formal ones. Blank slates, like legal gaps
343
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in general, are probably inevitable.
effectively is not.

But the failure to address blank slates
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